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INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL REPORT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CHILDREN, FAMILY, DRUGS AND ALCOHOLISM

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-NINTH CONGRESS

ON

REVIEWING WAYS OF USING DIPLOMACY AGAINST ILLEGAL NARCOTICS

MARCH 13, 1985

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INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL REPORT

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 13, 1985

U.S. SENATE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CHILDREN,
FAMILY, DRUGS AND ALCOHOLISM,
COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:11 a.m., in room SD-430, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Paula Hawkins (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Hawkins, Grassley, Dodd, and Metzenbaum.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HAWKINS

Senator HAWKINS. Good morning. I am Senator Paula Hawkins. I am chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Children, Family, Drugs and Alcoholism. I am pleased to welcome Senator Grassley who sits to my right. He is a new member of this subcommittee, and this announcement does make it official of our broadened responsibilities, and we welcome the challenge.

Today, we are going to discuss using diplomacy against illegal narcotics. It has always been my contention that the most effective way to stop the flow of drugs into this country is to cut it off at the source.

In my State of Florida, we have been successful in bringing in additional drug enforcement agents, customs officials, Coast Guard personnel, FBI agents, and temporary Federal judges. We have involved the military in battling illegal drug trafficking. This stepped up battle has netted impressive results, but let us face it, interdiction costs money, lots and lots of money, and these are tough budgetary times.

Now, let us look at the other side. We are all aware of the situation in Mexico involving the disappearance of Enrique Camarena. At first, the Mexican Government did nothing. We have all read the reports of Drug Enforcement Administrator Bud Mullin, who had to go to Guadalajara, and literally pound on the desk to get even the slightest bit of cooperation from Mexico.

The Drug Enforcement Administration, in my opinion, was betrayed, and with the cooperation of the Customs Service, the Drug Enforcement Administration decided to respond, and to hit Mexico where it hurts, in the pocketbook.

Customs virtually closed down the border, conducting thorough searches of every car that passed from Mexico to the United States.

The 15 minute wait at the border stretched to 5 hours. Tourists stayed away from Mexico in droves. The Drug Enforcement Admin-

istration also attempted to place an advisory on travel to Mexico, and succeeded in tainting the reputation of Guadalajara. Word was spread to the media that seven Americans had been killed there this year, and that two teenage Canadian tourists had been raped and killed there.

As you would expect, the Mexicans screamed. President de la Madrid contacted President Reagan. The Mexicans were furious but things were beginning to move. Then all of a sudden, the first weekend in March, there was a break in the case. Mexican police were involved in a shoot-out at a remote ranch where Camarena was said to have been spotted. Five prisoners were taken, leads were developed, and last week the bodies were found. What this all proved is something I have been saying for years: Trade and aid. That is the key to stopping the flow of illegal drugs. Try the carrot and if the carrot does not work, try the stick. In Mexico, it was too late for Enrique Camarena. We got nothing from the Mexicans this time around. Nothing.

But we can be forward-thinking about this from now on. We do not have to always be responding to world events. We passed the Hawkins amendment 2 years ago. It instructs the President to cut off aid to countries that do not take significant steps to eradicate their illicit drug crops.

The report card on eradication is out. In it, we see, for instance, that Bolivia which we intend to give close to $50 million next year, has not eradicated one single coca plant in the past year.

This is outrageous, and we, as Senators, should not accept it. But what will it take for the administration to uphold the law as it is spelled out in my amendment? Will it take another kidnaping? Will it take another death? It always seems to be the case in this country, that they never put a stoplight on the corner until after there has been an accident.

That kind of thinking has got to stop. It is time for the United States to get out in front in wiping out drugs at their source. It is time to use the leverage we have at our disposal to see that it is done. Now that the pressure is off Mexico, now that Enrique Camarena's twisted and broken body has been found, dug up from its grave and deposited at the side of the road; now that the search is over, what will we do? Are we going to back up and say, "hit us again?" Will we go back to "business as usual" in Mexico?

I would urge my colleagues and I would urge the President to do all that we can to see that we do not.

Let the word go out this day, that the U.S. Senate will no longer do business with those who do business with drug dealers. Drug dealers are mass murderers and it is time we started to treat them that way.

[Information supplied for the record follows:]

Fact Sheet on Major Drug Producing Countries for 1984

Country	
Peru, 1984	
Cocaine Production	60,000 (metric tons)
Opium Production	0
Marijuana Production	0
U.S. Assistance	76.2 (millions of dollars)
Multilateral	316.5 (millions of dollars)
Bolivia, 1984	
Cocaine Production	49,200 (metric tons)
Opium Production	0
Marijuana Production	0
U.S. Assistance	37.8 (millions of dollars)
Multilateral	126.6 (millions of dollars)
Colombia, 1984	
Cocaine Production	11,680 (metric tons)
Opium Production	0
Marijuana Production	7,500- 9,000 (metric tons)
U.S. Assistance	32.1 (millions of dollars)
Multilateral	1041.3 (millions of dollars)
Jamaica, 1984	
Cocaine Production	0
Opium Production	0
Marijuana Production	1,627- 2,977 (metric tons)
U.S. Assistance	114.2 (millions of dollars)
Multilateral	130.4 (millions of dollars)
Mexico, 1984	
Cocaine Production	0
Opium Production	21 (metric tons)
Marijuana Production	5,850 (metric tons)
U.S. Assistance	8.5 (millions of dollars)
Multilateral	882.5 (millions of dollars)
Burma, 1984	
Cocaine Production	550-650 (metric tons)
Opium Production	0
Marijuana Production	0
U.S. Assistance	14.8 (millions of dollars)
Multilateral	126.3 (millions of dollars)

Laos, 1984	
Cocaine Production	0
Opium Production	30 (metric tons)
Marijuana Production	0
U.S. Assistance	1.5 (millions of dollars)
Multilateral	14.3 (millions of dollars)

Thailand, 1984	
Cocaine Production	0
Opium Production	42 (metric tons)
Marijuana Production	0
U.S. Assistance	142.8 (millions of dollars)
Multilateral	285.3 (millions of dollars)

Afghanistan, 1984	
Cocaine Production	0
Opium Production	140-180 (metric tons)
Marijuana Production	0
U.S. Assistance	0
Multilateral	0

Iran, 1984	
Cocaine Production	0
Opium Production	400-600 (metric tons)
Marijuana Production	0
U.S. Assistance	0
Multilateral	0

Pakistan, 1984	
Cocaine Production	0
Opium Production	40- 50 (metric tons)
Marijuana Production	0
U.S. Assistance	611.1 (millions of dollars)
Multilateral	331.3 (millions of dollars)

Senator HAWKINS. Senator Grassley.

Senator GRASSLEY. Madam Chairman, I appreciate your leadership in this area, particularly, your very strong statement which is building on a foundation of a record of strong advocacy for greater law enforcement effort in this area.

We have, as a Nation, declared war on drug trafficking, but we have not put enough ammunition in to that effort at this point, and the ammunition must be made up of every political, economic, and diplomatic tool at our disposal to accomplish this.

I think it is necessary for our State Department to put on the same level at least—maybe on a higher plane—concentration on the war on illicit drug trafficking, the same way that they have on the war against political terrorists.

It seems to me, as evidenced by the recent kidnapings, the recent murders, the recent political harassment of political leaders of Latin American countries, that the efforts of those who believe in terrorism to promote the economic goal of illicit drug trafficking is pretty much the same as the goals of political terrorists, and that we ought to give it exactly the same attention that we give that.

I think hearings like this will bring that attention that needs to be brought to the problem, and hopefully, the resources will be put behind the war on drug trafficking that we have other diplomatic efforts that this Nation is taking.

Senator HAWKINS. Thank you, Senator. Senator Metzenbaum has joined us. I am thrilled he is on this committee. We work well together. Welcome, Senator. Do you have an opening statement?

Senator METZENBAUM. Yes, I do, Senator Hawkins, and I am happy to be here with you, and I am pleased that the hearing is being conducted.

I think when we deal in the area of drugs, and drug enforcement, we deal with an area that we would all like to do something about but none of us are quite certain what to do.

We have lived through the past 4 years, where we talked about the war against drugs, and those who deal in drugs. We added to our facilities with respect to the Coast Guard, and other governmental agencies becoming involved, and the fact is that the amount of drugs being brought in this country has increased almost at a rate far greater than the rate of our effort to stem the flow of drugs.

And we find ourselves in a position that the drug dealers are becoming more powerful than some of the countries with which we deal. They are becoming the force in international traffic as well as in some of the nations with which we deal.

We find that not only local law enforcement officials in some of those countries, but those at the highest levels, are engaged either directly, or indirectly, in the trafficking or at least in closing their eyes to the trafficking.

And we find ourselves in the position of saying, "We have got to do something." And yet my wife said to me the other day—as we talked about this matter—she said, "What would you do about it if you had all of the power to act?"

And I was frank to admit that I was not certain what the answer would be, because one of the problems that we face, realistically speaking, is that we can jump up and down about the actions of

some of the nations that fail to cooperate, but in the last analysis, we then are faced with the dilemma—and we are on the horns of a dilemma—do we cut off relations with those nations who are friendly to us with respect to other aspects of trade and are also an important bulwark against the incursion of Soviet forces?

How hard can we come down on them? Do we turn our backs, and as a consequence, they fall into either the Castro orbit or the Soviet orbit? And the answer is not a simple one. And so I think it is important that this committee conduct this hearing, as much for the purpose of finding out, what can we do? We know what we are unhappy about. We know how aggrieved we are about this importation of drugs.

We know that we can make strong statements to other nations and to the drug dealers of the world, but when all is said and done the challenge is not a simple one.

And you cannot just press a button and say that we are going to solve it. I join with you, Madam Chairman, as we have worked together on so many other matters, in trying to find a solution, trying to see what we are not doing that we should be doing, but being honest enough to admit that I am not certain how we can attack this problem effectively and without in some ways jeopardizing our own amicable relations with some nations where we would not like to put ourselves in a position of confrontation.

So I think we have to work together to find an intelligent solution, but I admit that I could not answer my wife as to what that solution is, and since you are not as close to me as my wife, I am not sure that I can answer you.

But let us work together and try.

Senator HAWKINS. I will give her a call.

Senator METZENBAUM. All right.

Senator HAWKINS. Our first witness today will be the Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Matters, Jon Thomas, who was recently and unanimously confirmed by the full Senate, and I must say that in a short time he has already compiled a remarkable record.

His expertise in the field of narcotics matters is well known and he has led us all to expect great things from him in this most important position.

He has not disappointed us with the recently published International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. It is an extremely incisive, well-researched and hard-hitting document, and Mr. Thomas and the members of his Division deserve much praise for its preparation.

I have gone over it many, many times and talked to many members of your staff, including you, Mr. Thomas. I welcome you here today. I commend you for all the good work you are doing and for the tremendous attitude you have about winning the war on drugs.

We look forward to hearing about this important report that came from your Department, in detail. Mr. Thomas.

STATEMENT OF JON R. THOMAS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS MATTERS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. THOMAS. Well, thank you, Madam Chairman. I have submitted a detailed statement containing highlights from our annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. As the co-author of the legislation which requires this report, you are of course quite familiar with its contents, and I therefore ask that my prepared statement be entered in to the record, and, with your permission, I would like to make some very brief opening remarks.

Senator HAWKINS. Surely.

Mr. THOMAS. I would also like to take this opportunity to applaud you for your personal leadership and commitment to the issue of narcotics control. It is certainly well recognized in this country as well as around the world.

I would like to concentrate on what I believe to be the key concern to the subcommittee today. I think your question would be, overall, can we substantially control the illicit drug trade in Latin America, and from Latin America. Well, I think we can, in spite of the often grim news about prospects for narcotics control in Latin America.

I think the increasing cooperation we are getting from several governments, which are burdened by the twin threats to their security, and to the health of their own youth, ridden by drug abuse, give us our improved chances for success in that region.

In terms of the number of active programs in place, and in terms of——

Senator METZENBAUM. I did not get that. What did you say gave us the chance for improved success in that region?

Mr. THOMAS. That the threats, the increasing threats to those countries themselves, of security threats to their own interests, their democracies, their institutions, as well as to the growing degree of drug abuse in those countries, are providing some opportunities for expanding narcotics control programs, as these countries begin to grapple with and wrestle with the difficulties they face themselves.

In other words, the formula has changed somewhat. These countries recognize that they are suffering as producer countries, as much as countries in the past have suffered as being consumer countries. And in fact many of these producer countries themselves are becoming the consumer countries of today.

The situation and climate, I think over the past few years has changed. That is creating some opportunities for us to strengthen our programs, our collaborative programs in the region.

Senator METZENBAUM. What about the extent of those where the traffickers actually are moving in on Government itself by bribery and other means? Threats? Killings?

Mr. THOMAS. That, Senator, is the point that I just made. As these countries recognize the threats to their own institutions, not only from corruption, bribery, intimidation, murder, but also, in some countries, linkages to subversive elements, insurgencies, and terrorist organizations, that increasingly, these countries begin to recognize that they are dealing with a threat to their national security.

However, even though we see some opportunities, we believe we are realistic in our appraisal. Our gains will not be easy and they will also not be overnight.

Many Latin American nations have finally had enough of their pervasive narcotics problem, and are not only striking back at the traffickers, but are increasingly prepared to make the sustained efforts needed to win.

The problems of crime and corruption, compounded by the problems of domestic drug abuse, have long been associated with drug traffickings. Now there is the evil spector of large, well-financed trafficker organizations, who have enough fire power to challenge several national police forces in the region.

As Secretary Shultz warned in his well-received speech on narcotics last September, "The civilized world faces not just separate and isolated incidents of violence and banditry, but a systemic global problem of growing proportions related to narcotics trafficking."

All nations are profoundly concerned by the increasing willingness of narcotics traffickers to use terrorist type violence to thwart these control programs.

The assassination of Justice Minister Lara Bonilla in Colombia in 1984 sparked a major expansion of Colombia's anti-narcotics programs.

The recent wave of killing of law enforcement officers in Mexico, including DEA Agent Camarena, has strengthened the resolve of narcotics control agencies.

For all these reasons, narcotics control has often been the No. 1 priority issue at recent meetings of Latin American presidents in their calls on United Nations officials, and in their bilateral meetings.

Although supply of illicit drugs remains high, and in some countries, production has increased this past year, gains are beginning to be made in narcotics control campaigns.

The traffickers in fact may have killed their golden goose. They have polluted their own countries with their drugs. Now added to the incentives for controls, such as the undermining of economies, the erosion of public institutions, the corruption of law and order, the violence and the threats of narco-terrorists, and insurgent groups who capitalize on the drug trade, and the destabilization of governments.

There is the great weight of domestic drug abuse that is injuring youth in Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, and other source countries, as well as the developed countries of Europe.

These pervasive problems have had a catalytic effect on governments. Today there is increasing momentum behind an international campaign to control narcotics production.

This campaign is especially evident in Latin America. Colombia, which has been the major source of illicit marijuana exported to the United States this past July 5, began an aerial herbicide eradication campaign that eliminated 3,000 hectares of marijuana by year's end, and a planned comprehensive program this year, through the use of herbicide spraying, may well eliminate well over 50 percent of the production in that country.

Colombia is now testing herbicides in a search for more efficient and comprehensive ways of eliminating coca, and is extraditing traffickers, while boldly sticking to its antinarcotics programs in face of increased violence and pressure.

Peru is striving to sustain a successful coca eradication program in the Upper Haullaga Valley under the guns of terrorists. Ecuador has started coca eradication and hopefully will nip in the bud the recently discovered coca cultivation in that country.

Mexico, Panama, and Brazil are striving to increase their eradication efforts. Venezuela reported destruction of all the cannabis sighted to date in that country. Belize has decided to embark on a renewed comprehensive marijuana eradication program this year through the use of herbicides.

The narcotics control objective will not be easily or quickly achieved. A "foreign legion" of profiteers work zealously to protect current links in the trafficking chain while striving to forge new ones.

Even as we eradicate coca crops in Peru and Colombia, new crops are being planted in Central and South America. These criminals use "narco" dollars to bribe police and other officials.

Traffickers and political terrorists are increasingly collaborating in South America. They readily resort to brutal animalistic violence, killing the children of reluctant farmers, workers in narcotics-control programs, and even cabinet ministers.

These are formidable obstacles but today our policy is paying dividends. We have stayed the course in Latin America, despite disappointing years when declines were promised and bumper crops were harvested. Despite death threats against our ambassadors in many parts of the region, and their staffs, and despite corruption and the lack of cooperation from source countries.

Now, more aggressive eradication campaigns, using "state of the art" methods are being implemented or negotiated in many countries.

Critical to this enhanced effort is the intensified cooperation of key donor countries in Latin America, such as the contributions of Italy and others, which have made possible broader United Nations narcotics-control programs in the region.

This enhanced campaign finds South American leaders working together on a regional strategy to control narcotics, and the Secretary General of the United Nations, making a "first ever" speech on the opportunities we now have for significant progress on this global problem.

This international cooperation is the essential ingredient to any lasting success. Recognizing that a more effective global response required greater international participation, we have sought to create opportunities, and to capitalize on initiatives as they have materialized.

And we have recognized from the start, the interdependence of our domestic drug abuse prevention effort with our narcotics-control program overseas.

The Reagan administration clearly understood that we cannot expect other countries to reduce the supply of illicit drugs destined for the United States, if we are not fully committed to tackling our

drug abuse problem at home, and I believe the record proves that we are.

We are committed on both the international and domestic fronts, and our efforts have been increasingly applauded by governments abroad.

Drug enforcement at home has been beefed up by the Attorney General and the Drug Enforcement Administration. Federal enforcement agencies and military resources have been effectively brought together in drug interdiction programs by the Vice President's National Narcotics Border Interdiction System.

And Mrs. Reagan's widely acclaimed activities in drug education and prevention among young people have been paying dividends, according to recent survey data, which show that high school age youth are turning away from drugs.

Perhaps one of the best indicators of how our domestic demand reduction efforts are being perceived around the world is the excitement being generated by Mrs. Reagan's plans to hold a First Lady's Drug Awareness Conference this spring.

Because of her work to bring public attention to the issue of adolescent drug abuse, other nations' First Ladies have expressed strong interest in sharing their concerns, mother to mother, about the drug abuse problem threatening virtually every nation.

The international community continues to look to us for leadership, which includes setting the necessary example at home, but we no longer work in solitude. Today, there is a shared concern among nations, that solving the overall narcotics dilemma is in all of our best interest, and that is what I believe will make the difference.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Thomas follows:]

TESTIMONY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY JON R. THOMAS
BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS MATTERS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
to
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ALCOHOLISM AND DRUG ABUSE
COMMITTEE ON LABOR & HUMAN RESOURCES
March 13, 1985

MADAME CHAIRMAN:

Because of your great personal interest in international narcotics control, and your co-authorship of P.L. 98-164, the Department welcomes this opportunity to discuss with you the findings in our International Narcotics Control Strategy Report for 1985 which was submitted to Congress on February 14. The report, which is prepared each year under the direction of our Department's Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, provides a country-by-country analysis of the narcotics situation in producing and transit countries.

The report shows that 1984 was a year of building bases for enhanced control programs and creating opportunities for large-scale actions in 1985. Genuine progress is reflected in the production reports on several countries, but there were some disappointments. On balance, we believe the events of 1984 put us on the threshhold of what should be our most productive year ever in narcotics control.[1]

The INCSR emphasizes that, more than perhaps at any time in recent memory, there are strong incentives for source nations to act in their own interests to control narcotics trafficking. The international community is affected by narcotics trafficking and abuse, and the attendant violence, corruption and social costs which undermine legitimate businesses and threaten national security in many parts of the world. In some countries, insurgents and terrorist organizations have established links to narcotics traffickers and these groups are now sharing in the narcotics profits. Producing nations are experiencing abuse and addiction among their own youth, and the demand for treatment and prevention has increased in these source countries.

All nations are profoundly concerned by the increasing willingness of narcotics traffickers to use terrorist-type violence to thwart these control programs. The senseless assassination of Justice Minister Lara in Bogota in 1984 sparked a major expansion of Colombia's anti-narcotics program. The recent wave of killing of law enforcement officers in Mexico, including DEA agent Camarena, has

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[1] In terms of the number of countries involved in active narcotics control programs and in terms of countries actively eradicating narcotic crops.

strengthened the resolve of narcotics control agencies on both sides of the border.

These global concerns are prompting new opportunities for narcotics control. Source and victim nations alike have a common interest in the success of control programs, and our efforts to capitalize on this common concern are reflected in our 1985 agenda and in our 1986 budget request, both of which are discussed in detail in the report, and summarized here.

It is important to note the key observations in this report. The Department, with the support of our colleague agencies, is saying it believes production of opium and cannabis declined in 1984 in the key source countries which supply the U.S. market, while coca production increased. However, the report highlights a projection that production levels for all three of these primary illicit narcotics will decline this year, and be below 1984 levels. This is one of the only times in recent memory where there has been an across-the-board projection of declines.

After reporting on 1984 developments, the report sets forth goals for 1985, including continued support for the Upper Huallaga Valley coca control project in Peru; seeking agreements to begin coca eradication in other parts of Peru; the restoration of law and order in Bolivia and an initiation of coca eradication; a vigorous Jamaica campaign to eradicate marijuana; resumption of aerial herbicidal eradication in Belize; expanded eradication programs in Burma and Thailand; continued efforts to increase the effectiveness of the Mexican control programs; suppression of opium cultivation in Pakistan and halting the flow of opiates across the Afghan border, and a more effective interdiction effort in Southwest Asia including elimination of heroin labs.

The report makes clear that a successful international effort requires more than just U.S. program assistance. International strategies must give top priority to crop control, including bans on cultivation and production, enforced when necessary by eradication. An effective international strategy should offer financial and technical assistance where needed for narcotic control projects. The United States will continue to provide assistance, which should be linked to crop control agreements to ensure success in reducing production, and will continue to promote increased assistance from other nations, especially the developed countries.

However, the governments of producing nations must demonstrate the political will to undertake effective crop control and interdiction programs. The corruption that has

undermined control efforts in many source countries must be stamped out by strong and determined governments. The international community must make common cause in a more vigorous, more widespread, and more united effort to control international narcotics production and trafficking.

1984 PROGRAM DEVELOPMENTS

1984 Summary

Opium production declined in Pakistan and Afghanistan, but marginally increased in other countries. However, adverse weather and a new eradication program in Thailand, a possible expanded crop eradication program in Burma, and continuation of the more effective sweep strategy in Mexico portend well for reductions in prospective opium poppy production in most sectors in 1985.

The important cocaine-related note for 1984 was that coca eradication was finally under way on an appreciable scale in Peru. As anticipated, coca production increased in both Peru and Bolivia, while remaining about level with 1983 in Colombia, which is seeking methods for comprehensive coca eradication through aerial spraying. While Bolivia's economic and political problems are understood, its failure to begin coca eradication remains a major disappointment, and it is hoped that the deployment of police forces on February 3 into the Chapare and Cochabamba areas will lead to the startup of Bolivia's eradication program.

The most important marijuana control development in 1984 was the Colombian eradication program which destroyed 4,000 hectares, including 3,000 hectares destroyed by an aerially applied herbicidal spray. Cannabis cultivation increased in Mexico, and the increase in Belize confirms traffickers' efforts to establish new sources of supply. Production probably held at about the 1983 level in Jamaica.

The other events of major moment in 1984, all of which are discussed in the report, include: the increased violence perpetrated by narcotics traffickers, and, on the promising side, the priority which several nations assigned to curbing the traffic in precursor chemicals, and, the emphasis which Latin American leaders in particular are giving to bilateral and regional programs.

Discussion

Domestic drug abuse and drug-related problems continued to escalate in 1984 in virtually every growing region and source

country. The impact on youth, the drug-related crime and violence, the pervasive corruption, the undermining of legitimate business activity, and the threats to national security as traffickers became involved with political insurgencies and/or resorted increasingly to terrorist-type activities attained heighted importance as issues which could influence government narcotics control decisions.

These concerns are prompting new opportunities, in calendar 1985 and the immediate years ahead, for significant expansion of drug control programs. Permeating all assessments of future action is the realization that there is genuinely a community of interest, that source and victim nations alike have a common interest in the success of control programs, and that the first beneficiaries of programs to curb trafficking and all of its related excesses are the source countries themselves. This realization is reflected in the program expansion of 1984, notably the gains in Colombia and Pakistan, the improvements in Mexico, and the enhanced programs in Burma and Thailand. This appraisal also finds root in the emerging alliance in Latin America, where national leaders have given new, stronger voice to demands for more effective narcotics control programs, and shown an increased willingness to work together, bilaterally and multilaterally, on regional approaches to control problems.

Western Hemisphere

The Government of Mexico increased its opium poppy and cannabis eradication efforts in 1984 in response to efforts by traffickers to expand, camouflage and diversify cultivation. The Mexican Attorney General's Office reports that the U.S.-assisted program eradicated 3,190 hectares of opium poppy in 1984, compared to 2,472 hectares in 1983 and 1,211 hectares in 1982. The MAGO eradicated 3,575 hectares of marijuana in 1984, compared to 2,674 hectares in 1983 and 886 hectares in 1982.

These gains notwithstanding, 1984 production of opium poppy apparently held at the 1983 level, according to revised DEA reports, while cannabis production increased in 1984. There are strong indications that the Mexican program has been less effective over the past two years and that corruption is playing a major role in this decline. The United States is pleased that President de la Madrid has stated clearly his intention to strengthen the eradication campaign against both opium and marijuana. While U.S. and Mexican enforcement agencies worked effectively together to detect and then seize the massive marijuana cache at Chihuahua, this large-scale marijuana production complex reinforces the point about the need for heightened vigilance and suppression of corruption.

Indeed, the Mexicans call their effort the "permanent campaign", recognizing that fighting narcotics requires a constant readiness and a long-term sustained effort.

The high performance agricultural spray airplane (the Thrush fixed-wing aircraft) and new spray boom which the Mexican and United States governments tested in late 1983 is being incorporated into the Mexican program. This package permits more effective spraying patterns at higher altitudes and speeds. The Mexican Government has also supported inter-regional activities, providing the Colombian Government with technical assistance on aerial marijuana eradication in 1984, just as it assisted Belize in 1983; the MAGO also provided a demonstration of aerial spraying for the Burmese.

The Government of Colombia has sustained a very impressive campaign against narcotics. The campaign moved into a decisive new phase on July 5 when the National Police began to test the aerial eradication of marijuana with the herbicide glyphosate. More than 4,000 hectares were eradicated in 1984, including 3,000 by aerial spraying of glyphosate, and the Colombians, who anticipate an even more comprehensive eradication program in 1985, are well on their way toward achieving control of cannabis production.

The Colombians are continuing their strong effort to control cocaine production as well, and have recently begun the testing of several herbicides in search of an aerially applied method of eradicating the coca bush. The Colombians have made a strong effort to suppress cocaine refining, including the major raid at Caqueta last March which resulted in the seizure of 10 metric tons of cocaine and the destruction of 14 laboratories. Since the assassination of Justice Minister Lara last April, Colombian police have staged more than 1,500 raids resulting in 1,425 arrests and the destruction of about 50 cocaine laboratories. In January 1985, President Betancur fulfilled his pledge, taken at considerable political and personal risk, to extradite traffickers to the United States for trial. Four of these traffickers were flown to Homestead Air Force Base and were arraigned for trial in Florida and in Washington, D.C.

The U.S.-supported Colombian interdiction program has been increasingly effective over the last few years. In 1984, the Colombians reported seizing 22 mt of cocaine; 2,870 mt of marijuana; and more than 500,000 dosage units of methaqualone, the latter figure reflecting an effective clamping-down on imports of powder which Colombian suppliers were using to tablet the pills.

Surveys indicate that Bolivian coca production increased in 1984, and that, as in 1983, Bolivian traffickers are seeking to capture more of the market profits by refining more Bolivian coca leaf locally into paste and base for direct sales, rather than shipping the raw product to Colombia for processing.

In August 1984, President Siles ordered Bolivian military and a 180-man Rural Mobile Patrol Unit (UMOPAR) into the Chapare region, where coca cultivation and narcotics trafficking have expanded dramatically in recent years. The Bolivian Government also mounted raids against traffickers in the Beni, another important narcotics trafficking center. But, after a few weeks, the drive bogged down and at year's end, the U.S. was strenuously urging resumed police action. Finally, on February 3, the new 260-man Specialized Rural Police Force (PRE) trained under the INM program were deployed into the Chapare. At the same time, the UMOPAR police units were redeployed into the Cochabamba area, and are carrying out operations in the nearby producing areas.

An effective law enforcement capability is a prerequisite for future coca control and eradication efforts. No coca has yet been eradicated. Several factors, including Bolivia's troubled economy, strong farmer resistance, and drug-related corruption have delayed start-up of eradication programs. The United States is disappointed by Bolivia's faltering efforts and inadequate commitment to narcotics control. The United States will continue to encourage strongly a more vigorous Bolivian narcotics control effort, with particular emphasis on achieving a net reduction in coca production in 1985.

The Government of Peru began eradicating coca bushes in mid-1983, pursuant to an assistance agreement with the U.S., and officials estimate that eradication, reported at 703 hectares in 1983, increased to over 3,100 hectares in 1984. The eradication program was temporarily halted in November and December, following a series of violent attacks on police units and workers, which climaxed in early November with the brutal killing of 19 eradication and survey workers. Also, the army had been moved into the Upper Huallaga during this period, as part of a State of Emergency declared by President Belaunde, to attempt to curb terrorist activities, particularly those of the Sendero Luminoso. The available information indicates that the killing of the eradication program workers was by gunmen hired by the narcotics traffickers.

The indications are that coca production expanded in 1984. Estimates of Peruvian cultivation vary widely, from the range of 50,000/70,000 hectares reported here up to as high as 180,000 hectares. However, estimates of how much of the Peru coca leaf becomes cocaine also vary sharply, with some

advocates of the higher cultivation estimates also contending that loss factors consume as much as 70-80 percent of the crop.

In 1985, the United States goal is for renewed commitment by the Peruvian government to crop control and to the protection of workers which is essential for the program to succeed.

A great deal more needs to be done in Bolivia and in Peru to begin to deal adequately with the many narcotics related problems. The United States and the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control have responded to requests to assist projects to extend both coca control programs and rural development assistance to the other major growing areas of Peru and Bolivia. UNFDAC designs for coca-control related programs in Peru and Colombia were completed in 1984 and initial implementation steps were taken; agreements on projects in Bolivia were also signed in 1985.

While events in Colombia have given rise to hopes that major progress is being made against narcotics trafficking in Latin America, they have also generated well-founded concerns that drug traffickers will seek new bases in other countries.

Panamanian Defense Forces this past May discovered and destroyed a large cocaine complex which had been constructed by Colombian traffickers in Darien province, and also destroyed some large plantings of coca in that area which is adjacent to the Colombian border. Panamanian authorities intercepted large quantities of ether used to refine cocaine, which was bound for that laboratory complex as well as laboratories in Colombia.

Brazilian National Police have had to step up their activities in the Amazonas region, where evidence suggests that traffickers are encouraging tribal groups to expand their traditional plantings of coca, and are establishing cocaine laboratories. Similarly, Argentina has been obliged to devote increasing resources to deal with the rising number of cocaine laboratories which have been established within its borders during the past two years.

Venezuela has adopted stronger anti-narcotics laws and the government has increased its cooperation with the Colombian National Police on narcotics trafficking and related problems in their common border region.

A variety of programs have been launched in the Caribbean and Central America, including efforts to improve radar surveillance and interdiction capabilities in the Bahamas and to improve on eradication and interdiction in Jamaica.

The Government of Jamaica eradicated 390 hectares of cannabis (ganja) in 1984, compared to 350 hectares in 1983 and has expanded its eradication effort in 1985. The Government has announced its intention to support a broader enforcement effort, including passage of new laws against illicit air strips. The U.S. Government has offered to support eradication and interdiction activities, and has urged Jamaica to undertake a comprehensive crop control program.

INM's Latin American regional program has included: enforcement and interdiction assistance to Belize; assistance to the Government of the Bahamas to increase the mobility of its anti-narcotics forces; training and maintenance assistance to the Haitian Navy's fleet of patrol vessels for a series of surveillance actions in the Windward Passage, a key trafficking route between Colombia and the U.S.; and provision of limited telecommunications, vehicular, and other equipment to Costa Rica for use in anti-drug activities. Many of the Caribbean countries have received INM-funded training through DEA and/or U.S. Customs.

As enforcement activities have improved in certain Latin American countries, there has been a shifting in the smuggling routes and tactics of narcotics trafficking organizations. A similar pattern of shifting sources has been seen in Southwest Asia, where the substantial reductions in opium poppy cultivation in Pakistan are being unfortunately overshadowed by uncontrolled production in Afghanistan.

Southwest Asia

Over half of the heroin entering the United States in 1984 originated as opium in Southwest Asia. Pakistan is considered to be the key to that trade, as an opium producer, a heroin refiner, and a transhipment point for other Southwest Asia opium, particularly from Afghanistan. The three most important factors in 1984 were: the continued effectiveness of the Pakistani ban on cultivation; the continued escalation of the domestic heroin addiction problem, now estimated at more than 150,000 persons; and the continued refining of heroin at labs on both sides of the Khyber Pass from opium cultivated in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Narcotics control programs are operating in the Malakand, Gadoon-Amazai and Buner areas with assistance from the United States and the United Nations, and the Government has embarked on a Special Development and Enforcement Plan, under the auspices of the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control, to extend its ban on opium cultivation into the bulk of the remaining major opium growing areas of the Northwest Frontier Province. The United States was especially encouraged by the

response of fellow international donors to this program, particularly Italy, the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia.

The Pakistanis closed three major laboratories in 1984, which enforcement officials claim had more of a market impact than the 41 labs closed a year earlier in the Khyber Agency. The United States has urged a high priority for lab suppression in 1985, given the large amounts of opium crossing the border from Afghanistan for refining by Pakistani traffickers.

Turkey continues to be effective in controlling diversion from its licit opium poppy cultivation, and controlling against illicit opium cultivation; the United States and other donors support Turkey's effort to prevent refining and transhipment of illicit narcotics from Southwest Asia.

Southeast Asia

The Government of Thailand increased its commitment in 1984 to controlling opium cultivation in civilian-police-military command villages in return for development assistance, and eradicated 175 hectares in what is believed to be the start of the first comprehensive Thai eradication program. Plans have been approved for an eradication effort in 1985 which could encompass 600 to 800 hectares.

The Thai Army, using permanently deployed, narcotics-targetted military companies, disrupted trafficking and refining activities along the border with Burma, continuing the military operations begun in January 1982 against the principal opium trafficking group on the Thai-Burmese border, the Shan United Army. The Thai Government has also continued to be effective in reducing the availability of precursor chemicals used in converting opium to heroin. The strong anti-marijuana program resulted in the eradication of an estimated 852 hectares.

In 1984, the Government of Burma conducted effective military operations against narcotics traffickers in the Shan and Kachin States which resulted in the seizure of quantities of narcotics, chemicals, refining equipment and weapons. The Burmese also eradicated an estimated 11,115 acres of opium poppy cultivation, and, at year's end, conducted a pilot test of an aerial herbicidal eradication project, which may lead, in 1985, to a substantial increase in the number of fields destroyed.

Other 1984 Developments

More than 1,700 persons from 85 countries participated in

INM-funded training programs, administered here and overseas by DEA and U.S. Customs.

In 1984, INM continued support to the pre-existing opium survey in Thailand, and assisted new aerial photography projects in Bolivia, Peru and Jamaica which provided data for this report. Negotiations on aerial photography to be produced in 1985 were concluded with Pakistan and Burma, and talks have been initiated in Mexico and Colombia.

INM continued its search for more effective eradication procedures, supporting the testing of herbicides in Colombia which may be more effective at large-scale destruction of coca bushes, and expanding the number of high performance Thrush aircraft which INM has available to deploy to countries undertaking spraying programs.

Increased emphasis was given to activities to curb trafficking in precursor chemicals, with improved results in terms of seizures. Another measure of the effectiveness of these efforts is the disruption of the refining trade with its attendant higher risks. Heroin labs are are being relocated from the Thai-Burma border to the Thai-Malaysia border. Cocaine labs, disrupted in Colombia, are being relocated to Panama, Argentina and even into the United States.

1984-85 PROGRAM STRATEGY

Assessment

While progress is being made, the United States and the international narcotics community face numerous challenges.

Worldwide production of illicit opium, coca leaf and cannabis is many times the amount currently consumed by drug abusers. Some governments do not have control of the narcotics growing regions, and prospects in several countries are dampened by corruption, even government involvement in the narcotics trade. Markets, refining areas and trafficking routes shift, and new production sources emerge even as success is achieved in eradicating current crops. This has been most prominently evidenced by the transitions from country to country of the centers of heroin and cocaine production.

A true international alliance of concerned nations must be forged to meet these challenges and others. The world requires narcotics control programs in all the significant producer countries, supported by increased assistance from the international community. But, far more nations must apply their political resources to this problem. The international community must capitalize on today's opportunities to expand and improve narcotics control.

There are greater incentives on the part of drug exporting countries to act, and to move swiftly. Virtually every source and many transit countries have suffered the problems of economic dislocations, institutional instability and crime related to narcotics trafficking. Several have also been besieged by political problems, including armed insurgencies supported by profits from the drug trade. These countries increasingly understand that they are the first beneficiaries of successful narcotics control programs.

In a major address on narcotics on September 14, 1984, Secretary of State George Shultz noted that the growing narcotics network was part of a trend toward international lawlessness that has been increasing ominously over the past two decades. He called narcotics trafficking, terrorism, and similar kinds of outlaw behavior "the modern versions of piracy." The Secretary noted there is ample evidence showing that these different types of lawlessness are linked, adding that the world has good reason to suspect that narcotics smugglers are being aided by certain governments, that they are getting protection and are being provided with safe havens and support in shipping drugs to the United States and other countries. Clearly the complicity of these governments in the drug trade, and government complicity in terrorist acts, are matters of grave concern, and the increasing awareness of these adverse effects are improving prospects for narcotics control.

One of the more encouraging signs in the battle against narcotics is the increased attention governments are placing on the need for bilateral and regional cooperation in anti-narcotics activities.

In August of last year, several leaders from Latin America traveled to Quito for the inauguration of President Febres-Cordero of Ecuador. It is very noteworthy that, in meetings among themselves, and with Vice President Bush, the first topic was not the issue of financial debt, nor regional military security, but narcotics control. What emerged from these meetings is what might be referred to as the "Spirit of Quito" -- that is, the recognition among many Latin American nations that they must now stand together and work together to wipe out this scourge which threatens their societies.

The United States believes that strong regional cooperative efforts are the key to lasting progress against narcotics abuse and trafficking in Latin America, throughout the Western Hemisphere, and in the world at large. Thus, the United States strongly supports the spirit coming from the meetings at Quito and Mar del Plata which called attention to

the need for increased international action to deal with the multiple political, economic, and social problems caused by narcotics trafficking.

Leaders of Latin American governments have recognized that drugs constitute a threat not only to the health of their citizens but also to their societies and democratic systems. They made this point emphatically in calls on the U.N. Secretary General at the last General Assembly which led to the first-ever speech on narcotics by a Secretary General (before the Third Committee in November when it considered the Latin American initiated and U.S. supported resolutions on narcotics control). The United States welcomes the personal leadership taken by Latin American heads of state and supports their strengthened commitment against narcotics trafficking and production.

Similarly, this emerging spirit is reflected in the suggestions of colleagues from South America to strengthen existing international institutions and encourage governments to improve national legal and social frameworks to deal more effectively with drug trafficking. The international community should look to existing institutions, like the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control, to achieve an immediate impact in meeting the narcotics challenge.

The United States stands ready to help the governments and peoples of Latin America, Southwest Asia and Southeast Asia to work together. The United States believes that national and bilateral efforts must be complemented by strengthened regional cooperation in all global sectors. Recently, the U.S. has offered to provide appropriate financial and technical support to improve regional narcotics enforcement information exchanges in Latin America as well as development of regional programs to create heightened public awareness of the personal dangers of drug consumption and the social and economic costs of the illicit drug trade. For several years the U.S. has supported the drug abuse initiatives of the Colombo Plan and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, and encourages the work of the Council of Europe's drug abuse and trafficking organization, the Pompidou Group, and others who approach this problem on a multinational basis.

The Administration is proud of its efforts these past four years to reduce drug demand here in the United States, where a very effective national awareness program led by Mrs. Reagan has dramatically heightened community responsiveness. Mrs. Reagan's plans for a conference of First Ladies to discuss, on a mother-to-mother basis, means of preventing drug abuse promises to be the start of new directions in international

prevention activities. The parents movement, so vital in this country, has spread to other societies, and will be a particular focus of upcoming discussions by Mrs. Reagan.

The 1985 Agenda

Obviously, much more remains to be done.

Bolivia must bring a substantial portion of its illicit coca acreage under control, enforced by eradication where necessary, enhanced by alternative development opportunities where feasible. That process begins with an appropriate, firm commitment of necessary troops and police to the Chapare and restoration of law and order. The United States takes due note of the deployment of the PRE forces into the Chapare and the UMOPAR forces into Cochabamba, both events on February 3, but also notes that no coca eradication has yet occurred.

Coca eradication in Peru resumed January 21 and there are encouraging reports that Peru is in the process of phasing back in full narcotics interdiction activity in the Upper Huallaga Valley, after a pause ordered by the GOP to address the security situation. The killings in the Upper Huallaga Valley and the lawlessness which permeates Tingo Maria are proof that narcotics control and terrorism must both share a high priority with the Government of Peru; indeed, the narcotics traffickers have adopted the ways of the terrorists.

Every consideration, including its economic and civil health as well as its need to curb an escalating domestic drug abuse problem, argues that Jamaica must soon undertake a more vigorous campaign to eradicate narcotics crops and curb imports of cocaine. Likewise, we look forward to supporting the decision of Belize to reinstitute the highly effective aerial eradication of marijuana it employed in 1983.

Burma must be successful in its ongoing and very promising efforts to find more effective ways of curbing the world's largest production of illicit opium. The recently initiated government eradication must be expanded if opium control is to ever succeed in Thailand. While Pakistan continues its laudable suppression of opium cultivation, it and neighboring nations must find ways of curbing the flow of opium products out of Afghanistan and suppressing the numerous heroin labs which operate along the Afghan-Pakistan border. Viable approaches must be found to Iran.

On a broader scale, the grower-to-user narcotics chain which stretches across five continents must be broken through a comprehensive program of international control. Pressure must be applied at all points in the chain -- through crop control; through increased seizures of both drug products and financial

assets; through intensified investigation and prosecution of traffickers; and through effective treatment and prevention of drug abuse.

International strategies must give top priority to crop control -- bans on cultivation and production, enforced when necessary by eradication, and by enforcement programs operating as close to the source as possible.

An effective international strategy should offer financial and technical assistance where needed for narcotic control projects. Similarly, assistance should be sought by drug producing nations and provided by donor countries with clearly defined crop control objectives. This assistance should be linked to crop control agreements to ensure success in reducing production. At present, too many governments are willing to support crop substitution programs, but not control; experience has shown that such programs are seldom effective without enforceable production controls.

We must continue to apply pressure to other governments to raise the foreign policy priority assigned to narcotics control, to integrate narcotics into their bilateral relations, and to upgrade the level at which narcotics matters are considered in foreign ministries around the world.

There is an immediate need to improve knowledge of all aspects of the problem and exchange information to improve coordination of policy and effort. The people and governments of illicit drug producing countries must become more aware of the problems they export to other countries -- and the domestic problems they are creating within their own societies.

Governments of producing nations must demonstrate the political will to undertake effective crop control and interdiction programs. Part of that demonstration of will must be the commitment of social and political as well as material resources, and promulgation and adoption of laws which facilitate control objectives.

The corruption that has undermined control efforts in many source countries must be stamped out by strong and determined governments. The degree of corruption and its deterrent effect on narcotics control varies by country, but the experience has been that unchecked corruption can seriously inhibit the best planned programs.

There is need for a higher level of awareness throughout the international community. The kind of intensive efforts that are being made in several countries must be communicated

through the world press. That awareness is increasing and it shows in many programs, including not only the improved interdiction and eradication efforts but government's decisions to consult their citizens in decisions on solutions.

There is unquestionably a great need for treatment and prevention programs, which should be developed and sustained by each nation, according to their own needs and in keeping with their resource capabilities. The international narcotics control program is one part of a complete strategy for addressing the drug problem, a strategy that gives high prominence and priority to nationwide efforts to reduce demand.

There is an undeniable need to continue efforts to enhance and expand intelligence collection, including not just knowledge of crops planted and harvested, and yields, but also of the ultimate distribution of these crops, domestically and in overseas markets.

We think we are responding effectively to these needs at the Federal level. Our cooperative efforts with DEA have never been better and continue to improve. We are realizing gains from collaborations with USIA on several projects, including public awareness campaigns in source countries. We can confidentialy anticipate increased support from the intelligence community. We work collaboratively with USAID in several countries.

Now, above all, the international community must work together, in an alliance at the national, regional and international levels, through bilateral and multilateral programs. The international community must make common cause in a more vigorous, more widespread, and more united effort to control international narcotics production and trafficking.

The 1986 Budget

The proposed FY 1986 budget is for $57.5 million, a 15 percent increase (or $7.3 million) over the FY 1985 request. The proposed budget continues the expansion of crop eradication programs, and builds upon the initiatives of 1984 and 1985.

The 1986 program will continue the INM emphasis upon Colombia as a key to establishing narcotics control in Latin America, while also sustaining the successful program trends in Pakistan, Burma and Thailand. We are prepared to support expansion of coca control efforts into the south of Peru and to provide support for a coca eradication program in Bolivia.

Summary

We believe we have the right strategy. We believe that the key ingredient of political will is now being manifested in a way that makes this strategy ever more effective. We believe significant progress is possible in 1985 and 1986, and indeed that we have built a base for continued progress in the years to come.

End

Senator HAWKINS. Thank you, Mr. Thomas. I must say that shared concern was manifested by 20 nations sitting around the table here in Washington, when I called the Western Hemisphere Conference On International Narcotics Control in January.

That was the first time they have all been in one room.

Mr. THOMAS. That is true.

Senator HAWKINS. The few nations that could not send their narcotics control officer, or their vice minister, at least sent their ambassador, locally, and really showed a shared concern that we are all in this together, and that we have to work together. I appreciate your contribution to that first Western Hemisphere Conference.

I must say that I have met with several of those countries since then, it is kind of a daily episode, and they are very serious, in most instances, and I am very proud of their resolve.

Senator Chris Dodd is a member of this new subcommittee, and he has joined us, and we will ask him to make a statement at this time, before we ask questions of Mr. Thomas.

Senator DODD. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and I will just submit this text of the opening statement. Let me just, if I could, first of all tell you, I am delighted to be joining you on this subcommittee as the ranking minority member.

I was the ranking minority member of the subcommittee of this full committee on the family issues, and now we have joined the two together with drug abuse and alcoholism. And as you know I was one of the cofounders of the Children's Caucus of which you are a member, and have testified at a number of occasions dealing with "latch key" children, child abuse, and other issues. And so it is a pleasure to be working with you on this committee.

I would just make two observations, if I could. One is, Madam Chairman, for just purposes of procedure here. I was not informed of this hearing until about 48 hours ago, and I would hope that in the future we would have better notice ahead of time, so that we would know about them in terms of preparation.

Senator HAWKINS. It has been scheduled for 2 weeks but I will check on that.

Senator DODD. Yes; because we were not notified until 48 hours ago. It is a very important thing to keep Members informed, just as a housekeeping procedure.

Senator HAWKINS. Surely.

Senator DODD. And second, I think it is very worthwhile to have people here this morning from the International Narcotics Bureau and the Drug Enforcement Administration, and obviously, the international linkage and connection is important. I might point out, however, that we have had hearings in the Foreign Relations Committee on this subject, and I think this is a significant question to be raised.

I would hope we might get into the question of domestic production and domestic trafficking, and comparisons between our penalties in this country with what we are also suggesting for other nations to be doing, so that we might get a fuller picture of this whole issue.

I think there is too often, at least lately, it has been convenient for politicians to point fingers at foreign countries, and not take a

closer examination and look at what is happening inside our own country in terms of these issues.

So I would hope that before the morning is out, we can have an opportunity to explore what is happening domestically as well in this particular arena.

But I do appreciate being kept informed of what is happening in the international arena because obviously, there is direct linkage there as well, and look forward to as I said, at the outset, working with my chairperson here, the Senator——

Senator HAWKINS. Chairman.

Senator DODD. Chairman, chairperson. I never——

Senator HAWKINS. There is no sex or gender to the chairman.

Senator DODD. Well, I would not suggest that but—[Laughter].

Senator HAWKINS. Now you see why he is great to work with. Thank you, Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Senator Dodd follows:]

Opening Statement of Senator Christopher J. Dodd
Subcommittee on Children, Family, Drugs and Alcoholism
March 13, 1985

Mr. Dodd: Madam Chairman, as Ranking Minority Member of the newly formed subcommittee on Children, Family, Drugs, and Alcoholism, I am pleased to attend this first hearing.

Last session I served as Ranking Minority Member of the Family and Human Services Subcommittee which had jurisdiction over such issues affecting children and their families as child care and child abuse prevention. That subcommittee was merged yesterday with what was formerly the Alcoholism and Drug Abuse Subcommittee. Ensuring that the overall concerns of children and their families, as well as specific concerns related to alcoholism and drug abuse, are adequately examined is a formidable task indeed. Given the importance of this task, I look forward to working with you on a wide range of future subcommittee hearings with a spotlight on the one-third of the American public who are children.

The issue of international narcotics trafficking is no doubt a priority item and one which deserves the attention of every Member of Congress. I am indebted to the witnesses for providing us this morning with information on the magnitude and seriousness

of the problem. However, I would hope that the witnesses could also provide us with an appreciation of the extent to which our drug problem is the result of domestic production and domestic trafficking. Moreover, it is important within the context of this hearing to look at links between domestic producers and international traffickers and what is being done here in this country to sever any such connections.

In closing, let me remark that as founder and co-chairman of the Senate Children's Caucus, I have worked closely with my colleague from Florida on a wide range of issues confronting children and their families. She has devoted a good deal of attention to such Caucus hearing topics as latchkey children, childhood accidents and injuries, and child sexual abuse.and has been a most active member of the Caucus. On this Subcommittee, we will oversee such critical programs for children as Headstart and the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, along with such essential family supports as Low Income Energy Assistance and the Community Services Block Grant program. I look forward to working with my colleague from Florida over the next two years as we examine these programs and address other compelling concerns of the one out of every three Americans who are children.

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Senator HAWKINS. The subject of this hearing is the International Narcotics Control Report, which is a report card that came out as a result of the Hawkins-Rangel Amendment to the Foreign Aid Bill (Public Law 98-164). Also, we will have it in Foreign Relations, I am sure, but, at the same time, we were able to invite foreign countries to participate today, and the country I was most interested in, of course, is Mexico. They declined to come. That is their prerogative. I have talked with them privately, and I regret, Senator Dodd, that you did not know until 48 hours ago about the hearing. We have had it scheduled for 2 weeks while they were shuffling the membership.

I could have mentioned it to you while we were voting all night the other night.

I have a question for you, Mr. Thomas. On Monday, the Mexican Foreign Secretary, Bernardo Sepulveda met with U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz to discuss narcotics control.

He was quoted in yesterday's New York Times as saying there was an agreement that "a police issue should not be translated in to a foreign policy issue." Is that an accurate report of the agreement, from the meeting between the Secretary of State and Foreign Secretary Sepulveda?

Mr. THOMAS. Well, you are correct, Madam Chairman. A meeting with the Foreign Minister of Mexico, Mr. Sepulveda, was held on Monday with the Secretary of State, extensive meetings. I participated in those meetings, and, while I would not want to comment on the specific statements taking place in those meetings, I could give a general characterization which I think would answer your question.

The issue, and I think Foreign Minister Sepulveda did make that statement following the meeting, that this is a police issue, in his opinion, but I can assure you that Secretary of State George Shultz made it clear, that the U.S. Government sees this as a major bilateral issue with the Government of Mexico. We see it as a significant foreign policy issue. That the matter of the U.S. concern, not only on the *Enrique Camarena* case, but on the overall success, and the necessity for success of the narcotics-control program in Mexico. That those issues were discussed, and that Secretary Shultz made his concern very clearly known to the Foreign Minister of Mexico.

I, too, read the New York Times article which described Secretary Shultz as being strong on that subject, and tough. Yes, ma'am, he was.

Senator HAWKINS. Thank you. I have some questions for Mr. Lawn on that same subject. According to the 1985 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, the Government of Bolivia has failed to eradicate a single coca plant during the past year. Is that accurate?

Mr. THOMAS. That is accurate, as contained in our report. We also indicated in our report that we are disappointed with the lack of progress made in Bolivia this past year. In 1983, we signed four agreements with the Government of Bolivia to initiate a comprehensive narcotics-control program in that country, and, frankly, the results to date have not been all that good.

However, I would say that taking into consideration the severe economic and political climate in Bolivia, some of the lack of progress is understandable.

Over this past year, attempts have been made to re-establish law enforcement in the Chapare region of Bolivia which is one of the key coca-producing areas of Bolivia. And in February of this year, specially trained and equipped police and UMOPAR Civil Guard units have been moved back into the Chapare region to re-establish law and order, which will hopefully lead to the beginning of an eradication effort this year.

I have been assured by our Ambassador to Bolivia, Ambassador Ed Corr, who I believe has done a magnificent job under very difficult conditions, that the chances of seeing eradication begin this year are good, in the Chapare region. To do that we must ensure, however, that adequate security and law and order has been established, and that is what we are working on now.

So I would suggest that while we were disappointed with the progress to date, it is certainly my hope that when we submit this report to you, others in the Senate and the House next year, that we will be able to talk about the progress made in Bolivia, the beginnings of an eradication program this year, and prospects for expanded opportunities in Bolivia including the United Nations' program under the United Nations Fund For Drug Abuse Control project, which hopefully, will begin to take place in the Ungas region, another key coca leaf producing region of Bolivia.

Senator HAWKINS. Well, let us contrast Bolivia to Colombia. Now Colombia is under seige. They are under attack constantly. They have done a fantastic job. They are extraditing criminals to Miami. They made the step.

President Betancur made that step. He extradited those Colombians, even though Carlos Leder, the criminal, the coca trafficker, said he would kill five American Drug Enforcement agents, or anyone involved in this drug war, for every Colombian extradited. He extradited those Colombians. He is eradicating. He is in control of the battle, and I do not see President Siles, or anybody around Siles in Bolivia doing anything but taking millions in U.S. grants and in low-interest loans during the last 3 years. One-half of the total cocaine for the world comes from Bolivia, who I believe has no one in charge at the moment.

I do not believe, and I guess it would be hard for a State Department person to say that Bolivia is a good investment for the U.S. taxpayer, when we are talking about tax dollars going to this country.

Mr. THOMAS. Well, first of all, I am glad any time to compare other nations' progress with that of the Government of Colombia, which I believe now represents what can be done, not only in the Latin American region, but around the world, when a country decides to take the necessary steps, has the political commitment, the guts, to go ahead.

And certainly, if you were to use that criteria, Bolivia does not stand up well. When we discussed this with the Bolivians we used the Colombian example.

I believe that the Government of Bolivia is well aware of the importance we attach to the issue of coca control as well as the efforts against the narcotics traffickers in that country.

Senator HAWKINS. Who is the Government in Bolivia?

Mr. THOMAS. Well, we do have an elected Government of Bolivia. President Siles is still in power. There will be elections coming up this later spring, early summer.

Senator HAWKINS. It is supposed to be June I believe, but are they not on strike? Is not Bolivia on strike today?

Mr. THOMAS. Bolivia does have a general strike, which only of course complicates getting anything accomplished, much less narcotics-control programs.

So I believe we have made our points clear to them. I know you have on a number of occasions. They certainly have heard what you have had to say about your firmness on the need for improved narcotics activities in that country.

We have made the same points, perhaps privately, but we have certainly made those points. I would suggest, that given the recent activities of the Bolivian police and military in the Chapare region, the stepped up enforcement activities that are now going in to place, there have been some special activities in the Beni where the narcotics traffickers operate. That we measure that very carefully. They know our concerns. And I am watching very closely the results of this ongoing campaign in the Chapare, expecting the desired results, which should be, and must be, the beginning of the coca eradication effort this year.

Senator HAWKINS. Well, every nation in Latin America is very upset with Bolivia. It is not just this Senator. It is not just other Senators. It is not just your department. Every nation is really concerned that Bolivia is not in charge of its borders and exporting this crop, not only north to the United States, but south, they have a tremendous consumption problem, and every nation that I have been in touch with, most of the presidents of those countries have some questions on other countries, and I do not mind saying, I am absolutely disgusted with Bolivia.

I am out of patience, I have had it up to here, and I am finished with Bolivia and this government, as far as giving them any assistance.

I know you have to be a diplomat, and as Senator Metzenbaum has said, we have to be nice to our friends, but I do not think it is friendly to flood this world with cocaine. Absolutely nobody is in charge in Bolivia at the present moment.

Senator Metzenbaum, do you have some questions?

Senator METZENBAUM. I think Senator Dodd is ranking and——

Senator DODD. No; go ahead.

Senator METZENBAUM. I just have a few questions. Mr. Thomas, the crop eradication program. I am concerned about how effective it is. I read the article recently in the national news magazines, that as you eradicate in one area, the land areas are so large, that the crops are grown in other areas in the interior, that they are not known about.

What about that, as a practical problem? Is that a matter of concern?

Mr. THOMAS. It is a matter of great concern. We have had experience in this around the world, often referred to as the balloon technique. Step on it in one place, it bulges out somewhere else.

And our strategy, particularly in Latin America, is focused on a regional narcotics-control effort in all countries, and I am heartened to say, that other countries in the region, such as Venezuela, Brazil, and Panama have looked at what could happen in a country if they allow narcotics production to take hold.

And these countries are now taking preventive steps to try and keep the same thing from occurring in their own countries.

We encourage that, we are supporting that in many cases financially, with beginning crop control programs. My statement on Ecuador, where we have recently discovered near the Colombian border, significant areas of coca cultivation, and that new government's efforts, under the Presidency of Mr. Febres-Cordero, is that they want to eliminate all new coca cultivation.

We are supporting that financially, technically, and in any other way we can. So, I would agree it is a major concern of ours, and what it really tells us is that we cannot concentrate on just one area or two areas. We must be equally vigilant in all areas.

Senator METZENBAUM. Give the committee your appraisal as to the impact that the drug traffickers have had vis-a-vis the governmental operations of our South and Central American friends and whether that impact is growing or decreasing.

Mr. THOMAS. The impact of the narcotics-trafficking organizations has been, in some areas, staggering. We know that the issues of corruption and intimidation, the breakdown of judicial systems, the threats, the murders, over a period of time will have severe impact.

I believe, in large part, that is what spurred the Government of Colombia to take the aggressive actions they have taken, and they are willing, I believe, to take the necessary political heat and costs as a result.

Other countries saw that, and Senator Hawkins pointed out that if some other governments in the region are concerned about Bolivia, I can assure you that other governments in the region also saw what occurred in Colombia and began to discuss among themselves how important it was that it not occur in their own countries, and they are cooperating very closely with the Colombian Government itself.

We have seen the narcotics traffickers look for new safe havens in the region, as the Colombians and others tighten the screws against them. So, we must have a comprehensive approach against narcotics traffickers. There is no way that I believe that they are going to intimidate the key governments of the region.

They certainly are not going to intimidate us. In fact, I think it is safe to say that we have every intention of stepping up our efforts against narcotics trafficking organizations in the region and raising the ante.

Senator METZENBAUM. If we had a chart before us today, would it indicate the importation of drugs going up at the present time, holding steady, or going down?

Mr. THOMAS. Based on our best estimates, and when you are referring to drugs, we usually refer to heroin, cocaine, and marijua-

na, and there are other drugs, of course, that the amount of drugs consumed in this country has, in some of the drug areas, some drugs have stabilized, and others have gone up. It is very hard to collect this data. I think it is safe to say, that from some areas of the world, that production and shipping has gone down. Marijuana is one of them, for example, from Colombia, the United States' largest supplier of marijuana, only a couple of years ago, is now way down in its percentage of supply, and we expect next year we will take that out completely.

Other countries, of course, will try and will look at, in their particular areas, of perhaps increasing production. Overall, I think the trend lines that you would want to draw would show that there is some stabilization, and some drugs increase in others. What you would also find, however, particularly in the issue of cocaine, which is, I think, the drug that has received the most attention over the last year, that new markets are being created around the world.

When I travel in Western Europe, the one common concern I hear is how frightened they are by the increase of cocaine abuse in their societies, and the narcotics traffickers from Latin America are encouraging that market.

They are out there like marketeers hawking their products, developing new markets where they cannot find an expanding market in the United States. Not to mention that they are also expanding and creating cocaine and coca paste markets in their own societies.

So, I think the trend line, the production line on cocaine, is up. On other drugs it would not be as clear, and I would be hopeful, that in the case of marijuana, it may actually show some decline this year.

Senator METZENBAUM. We hear a lot these days about high purity heroin, and heroin being a killer drug, and each several days, we find that some other person—I think last night's news reported here, in Washington, another death from high purity straight heroin. Where is it coming from, what do we know about it, and what are we doing about it?

Mr. THOMAS. The majority of heroin consumed, particularly here, in the Northeast corridor, comes from Southwest Asia. About 50 percent, or so, of the overall amount of heroin consumed in this country does come from that area as well, often called the Golden Crescent. The vast majority of opium in the region was once produced in Pakistan.

In 1979, some 800 tons of opium were produced. Due to the narcotics-control program in that country, that producton has now been reduced to about 45 tons, and we believe it will be coming down significantly over the next few years.

However, opium production is still high in Afghanistan and Iran, increasingly refined into heroin, in Pakistan, and then moved out into the international markets.

Senator METZENBAUM. The other day, I heard on the news one day that a plane, I think it was an Avianca but I am not certain, was impounded because it was carrying narcotics. A day or two later I heard that it was released. What happened?

Mr. THOMAS. The answer to that is it was released, but under very closely controlled legal understandings with the necessary fines, fees, and a form of a bond that was posted by that company. The U.S. Customs Service, which I think has done a marvelous job in this area has——

Senator METZENBAUM. Has what?

Mr. THOMAS. The U.S. Customs Service, which I believe has done a very excellent job in this area, has that matter under litigation and is discussing it with the Avianca Airlines' leadership.

Senator METZENBAUM. Is there a bond up equal in value to the value of the plane?

Mr. THOMAS. I understand that there is. I do not know what the value of the bond is but I know it is high.

Senator HAWKINS. To interrupt the Senator a moment, $119 million was the value of the aircraft. I recall talking to the Customs Commission about that. They put up a $2 million bond, and the cocaine was worth $600 million, that was aboard. That is what I am told. Those figures are staggering.

Mr. THOMAS. Yes.

Senator HAWKINS. I would have kept that aircraft, I would have auctioned that aircraft off, and destroyed that cocaine. I was told of a "legal technicality". Avianca is the airline of Colombia but Colombia leased the aircraft from World Airlines, so technically, this is one of those loopholes that we find in Florida all the time, where they really did not even own the aircraft.

I would have fined World Airlines. I mean, I know the lawyers go bananas, but we have to get to the root of this evil. We have seized under the new forfeiture laws property, we have seized aircraft, we have seized all kind of tangible goods.

But I think it was a bad signal to send, other than it was Colombia who has been cooperating with us. I mean, if it had been Bolivia as you know, we would have had an auction that night, but still, it sent the wrong signal, and I agree with the Senator, that something is wrong, when we are talking tough today, and in the actual circumstance we are confounded by a $2 million bond.

Senator METZENBAUM. I must confess, I did not know all the facts, but I know I was shocked when I saw the plane was released. If anybody in this room came in through Customs, and they had contraband, or if they had something that they had not declared, there would have been a hold put on it and you would not have gotten it back for months, and maybe years, if at all.

Here you are talking about $600 million worth of drugs, you are talking about a plane—I did not know the value, $119 million—no secret about it—$2 million is an absolute drop in the bucket. It is not even a day's wages for the right kind of drug traffickers, and I think that if the State Department was involved in securing the release, I do not care what government was involved—even if it were our own government—I would say that it was an egregious error, and something about which I do not think there ought to be any sense of pride, and runs contrary to the very statements that we are all making here about getting tough and doing that which has to be done.

But in all fairness, Mr. Thomas, I am not sure that you were the moving party, or you were involved in this, and I would therefore

ask you if, within the next 48 hours, whether this committee and its members, might have an actual report of what was done, why it was done, and what the dollar figures were, because I think it is just a travesty, and if there is some explanation, then I think this committee is entitled to know that, and the American people are entitled to know it.

Mr. THOMAS. I will assure you we will have that information to you within 48 hours.

[The information referred to follows:]

SEIZURE OF AVIANCA 747

On February 15, 1985, an Avianca 747 which arrived in Miami as flight 752, was seized by the District Director of Customs in Miami. The aircraft was seized following the discovery 2 days earlier of 2,478 pounds of cocaine concealed in a shipment of cut flowers. The decision to seize the aircraft was based on indications that Avianca personnel employed at the Miami Airport either consented to the drug smuggling operation, or failed to exercise the degree of care and diligence required by law to prevent the smuggling operation from continuing. The aircraft was not seized immediately upon the discovery of the cocaine so that a controlled delivery of the contraband would not be jeopardized.

The Colombian Ambassador to the United States requested a meeting with the U.S. Customs Service after a series of meetings with lower-ranking Colombian officials concerning the seizure. That meeting was held at U.S. Customs Headquarters on February 18, 1985, at 10:00 am. Meeting participants included: the Commissioner of Customs and several senior staff; the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Enforcement; the Colombia Desk Officer from the Department of State; the Colombian Ambassador to the United States and senior embassy commercial staff; attorneys for Avianca from 2 law firms in the United States; and, legal staff of Avianca.

At the meeting, the Colombian Ambassador stressed the cooperation which the Colombian Government has underway with the United States in the narcotics area. He specifically referenced the extradition treaty and eradication and substitution programs. Representatives from Avianca stressed the importance of the seized aircraft (the only Avianca 747 cargo plane flying regularly to the United States) to Avianca. The Commissioner of Customs restated the reasons for the Customs action and the history of Avianca as a conveyance for the smuggling of narcotics. The Commissioner acknowledged the Colombian efforts in the suppression of narcotics trafficking.

As a result of those discussions, an agreement was reached and finalized by U.S. Customs attorneys and the Avianca legal staff which provided for the following actions to be taken by Avianca in exchange for the return of their aircraft:

- Avianca agreed to furnish Customs with an irrevocable, unconditionnal letter of credit in the amount of $1,000,000 and a promissory note in the amount of $982,400 to ensure collection of whatever monetary penalties are ultimately assessed against the airline for the narocitcs found. (The amount is based on a penalty of $50 per ounce of cocaine found in the cargo.)

- Avianca agreed to return the aircraft to the custody of the U.S. Customs Service immediately, if after an investigation a final determination to forfeit the aircraft is made by the U.S. courts.

- Failure to return the plane will result in Avianca's voluntarily surrendering its foreign carrier certificate, which permits it to land all of its planes in the United States.

There is nothing in the agreement that waives Avianca's right to pursue mitigation of the penalty, or Customs' right to pursue forfeiture of the aircraft.

Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you very much.

Senator HAWKINS. Thank you.

Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Senator HAWKINS. Senator Dodd, do you have some questions?

Senator DODD. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Mr. Thomas, my chairman's opening statement said it was too late in Mexico—I presume you were talking about the Camarena case. I wonder if you might share with the committee what new information, if any, the Administration has acquired with regard to that particular case, in our conversations, particularly with Foreign Minister Sepulveda in the country.

Mr. THOMAS. Well, I would perhaps suggest that the next witness, Acting DEA Administrator Jack Lawn, who I know has been working on this issue intensively over the last few weeks, might be a better person to ask than myself. But I would comment, that we have viewed this entire episode with great concern.

We know, of course, and as we have said in our report, that we are not—we are aware, and we know, that the effectiveness of the narcotics campaign in Mexico has gone down.

Senator METZENBAUM. Has what, sir?

Mr. THOMAS. Has gone down. The effectiveness of our narcotics-control program in Mexico, and that this is in part due to corruption. It is an open statement in a public document.

We are assured, however—and I have met frequently with senior Mexican officials—that the government of President de la Madrid of Mexico, which has declared, on many occasions, its stand on the moral renovation in that country, and President de la Madrid's personal commitment against corruption, that we expect them to intensify their efforts to remove any corruption from the narcotics program.

So it is an issue that has been discussed, and we are assured by President de la Madrid, that the Government of Mexico is taking steps in that regard.

Senator DODD. Can you share, characterize—and I am asking for you to make a general statement, obviously, because each country has its own specific personalities and problems. But as you look around the globe from Pakistan and Turkey, and Southeast Asia, Latin America, obviously, to what extent does political corruption contribute to production and trafficking? I think there is an assumption here, that without it, we would not have anywhere near the degree of activity we do.

Is it pervasive? Is it endemic? Is it selective corruption in various countries, and other reasons for the success of drug production and trafficking?

How widespread is the political corruption, speaking now in a global sense?

Mr. THOMAS. Well, political corruption is widespread. It is perhaps more pervasive in some countries than others, and we address that as a reality that we deal with.

I believe the way we see it is that in order for a country to be effective against narcotics production and trafficking, it must first develop the necessary political will to do something about the problem.

And one of the most difficult areas for a government to develop and then assert its political will is dealing with corruption in its own system.

I would add, however, that corruption, as serious and severe of a problem as it is for our success, and we recognize it as such, can, and often does accompany narcotics trafficking wherever it goes, including in to our own country. The amounts of money you are talking about, the intimidation that often goes along with narcotics trafficking organizations, provides incentives for corruption and stimulates corruption.

We measure a country's commitment not only by its willingness to engage in narcotics control programs, but through its willingness to crack down on corruption in its own institutions, and I believe that is a key element to any success that we will have anywhere in the world.

Senator DODD. Could you get a bit more specific, if you can. For instance, we know and have heard a great deal about the problems in Mexico with this particular issue.

Is there a problem with that, say, in a place like Pakistan? The reason I mention these others, Pakistan and Bolivia, for instance because there are economic factors that play in to these things in addition to the political corruption questions, where you have long-standing relationships between the production of certain crops, and the viability of, or the economic viability of certain sectors of the population in those countries.

Take out if you will, and pick the major problem areas of Bolivia, of Pakistan, for instance, Turkey. How widespread is the political corruption in those countries, in terms of the problem that we have?

Mr. THOMAS. Well, what I would suggest is that recognizing that corruption is the issue that it must be in the narcotics area, and in a public session like this, not wanting to get in to specifics, although I would be more than willing to discuss this with you or this committee in a closed session, including our concerns, as they relate to specific countries, which I think would probably be more appropriate for that kind of discussion.

Corruption is something that we must face, we do face. I would like to make one comment, though, in that Mexico has been raised a number of times this morning.

Although we have seen some decrease in the program's effectiveness in Mexico, I would like to state, that Mexico has been one of the more successful countries, however, in dealing with this narcotics production problem.

The eradication efforts in Mexico which have been ongoing for some 10 years have provided very positive results.

Senator HAWKINS. But they have not arrested one major narcotics trafficker in 8 years.

Mr. THOMAS. They have not arrested a major narcotics trafficker; however, they have eradicated thousands of tons of marijuana, and hundreds, or scores of tons of opium.

Senator DODD. Let me just ask you one other question here, and maybe some of these should go to your colleague who will be testifying momentarily. One of the complaints you hear—not only do you hear the—you have heard the arguments before, well, if the

United States did not have a population that was so addicted to all of this, the producers would not have as much of a market, to begin with. Not an illegitimate argument.

The second argument is that our penalties in this country for possession and use of drugs that we are concerned about, that we are threatening to cut off foreign aid for, and so forth, that actually the penalties for possession and trafficking, in many of the countries we are talking about, are more severe than our own penalties in this country.

Is that a correct characterization?

Mr. THOMAS. In some cases it is correct. I think the point that you are making is an excellent one, because I have often stated that our job is impossible if we are perceived overseas as only wanting to export the solution to our drug abuse problem in this country, and that has been a perception in the past.

The often stated comment, "Well, if there were no demand, of course there would be no supply." Economically, that may be true. In fact, however, you hear that argument less and less because many of these producing countries in fact are becoming the consumers of the drugs they produce right there. That argument has far less legitimacy today than it did before, if it was ever legitimate.

Also, I am often able to point to the fact that this country has come to grips with its drug abuse problems, is doing much more now than it did before, on the enforcement side as well as the demand reduction side, often at the grassroots level.

Some 4,000 parents organizations have sprung up around this country against drug abuse. We are starting to see some positive indicators in the drug abuse trends.

So I find that as we have pointed out, and Secretary Shultz has, on many occasions, that we cannot expect any country to do what we are unwilling to do here, domestically, and to the degree that we can strengthen our own commitments, our own laws, I assure you that frequently, when we sit down with leaders of foreign governments, that are narcotics-producing countries, they will quickly bring out the latest Time magazine article, or New York Times article on marijuana production in this country, or drug abuse in this country, or the ability to buy drugs openly, in lower Manhattan, as an indication to us, that they not only are aware of the problems here, but in a question to us, how sincere are we.

I find, however, fortunately, that we are able to convince them more and more of our commitment here, at home, and that has assisted us in our international programs.

Senator DODD. Let me ask you this: Do you have any indication at all—we have a significant amount of drug production in this country. It is often said that a major cash crop in California, for instance, is marijuana.

And other States have similar problems. To what degree—and again a ballpark figure, unless you have got some specific data—but to what degree are American users of drugs depending upon production that occurs in the United States as opposed to production outside of the United States?

Mr. THOMAS. Marijuana is the primary example. I know of no coca production of opium production in the United States, and I be-

lieve that over the past couple of years, the domestic eradication campaign against marijuana, headed up, led by and encouraged by the Drug Enforcement Administration, has been increasingly effective.

I understand they now have cooperative agreements with all 50 States, and that in many States, their efforts and campaigns have been very impressive.

So I am told that the production of marijuana, domestically, here, in the United States, is being controlled, and that it represents today, somewhere around 10 percent, plus or minus a few percentage points, of the total supply.

Senator DODD. Is marijuana the single largest cash crop in California?

Mr. THOMAS. I do not know and I have been told by people that have looked at it, that it is not.

Senator DODD. It is not?

Mr. THOMAS. Right.

Senator DODD. What is the Administration doing about the so-called "designer drugs". You now know, of course, it is possible to synthetically produce heroin, and that it is not even illegal in this country. Are we doing anything about that?

Mr. THOMAS. An often, not discussed underrated problem of drug abuse in this country, and everywhere, are the psychotropic drugs, the designer drugs, the ability to put drugs together and get other effects.

I believe that we are putting more and more attention into that area. It is perhaps, in some cases, in some communities, the most severe drug abuse problem that we confront, and it must be given the same attention as we do the other drugs.

Senator DODD. Well, is the administration going to be submitting legislation calling for the banning of the production of—right now, it is legal. The synthetic production of heroin is not illegal. Is that true?

Mr. THOMAS. I cannot answer that. I do not know.

Senator HAWKINS. I believe we are trying to have control. We could ask Mr. Lawn, who is head of the Drug Enforcement Administration, but I believe we are trying to control the precursor chemicals that make these drugs.

Senator DODD. I will raise that with him, when he comes up. Anyway, thank you very much, Mr. Thomas. I appreciate your testimony here this morning.

Senator HAWKINS. Would you finish the answer to Senator Dodd's question. What about Turkey?

Mr. THOMAS. Turkey in regard to——

Senator DODD. Political corruption.

Mr. THOMAS. Political corruption?

Senator HAWKINS. How are they doing on drugs?

Mr. THOMAS. I was in Turkey in December of this past year. To the best of our knowledge, Turkey is one of the major success stories in the area of eliminating illicit opium production.

We do not know of any illicit opium production in Turkey. The Turks have been very good at taking control of that problem. Narcotics trafficking through Turkey is an issue.

Turkey is a land bridge between Southwest Asia and Europe, and a very considerable amount of the heroin and opium products produced in Southwest Asia do come through Turkey.

I have no doubt, as I would probably be able to say in every country where there is narcotics trafficking and production, that there is some corruption that goes along with it. But I do know that the Turkish officials have stepped up their activities to interdict the heroin and opium coming through their country, and in fact, they often say that they are not only very concerned about this for international reasons, but because they are convinced that narcotics trafficking is so interlinked in their country with terrorism, directed against their interests, that they approach narcotics trafficking from the double edge of both reducing the trafficking and reducing the potential source of financing for the terrorist organizations that exist in that region.

Senator HAWKINS. They have done a great job. I met with some of their representatives last week. Interestingly enough, they have a lot of women involved in this question now because I think mothers see this manifestation probably before a lot of the men, but I do commend Turkey for what they do, and with their neighbors, I really take my hat off to them and their big complaint, of course, is transit, sealed cargo that comes through there.

Mr. THOMAS. Yes.

Senator HAWKINS. And they are concerned about terrorism. Should we not all be concerned about terrorism?

Mr. THOMAS. Yes.

Senator HAWKINS. And drugs?

Mr. THOMAS. The linkage between, perhaps defining it beyond just terrorism, but broadening that in to violence and lawlessness, I think is the key issue. We see narcotics traffickers assuming more and more the style of terrorist organizations. Murder and intimidation, trying to intimidate a full society as well as just people.

We know that narcotics production in some areas is linked to subversive elements, insurgencies, but it is the general lawlessness that accompanies narcotics production and trafficking, that puts this issue very squarely into the area of national security and international security, and we are addressing that issue as much now from a national security perspective as from a drug abuse prevention and enforcement issue.

Senator HAWKINS. What is Nicaragua's role? We have had the Vice President give a speech on this and the Secretary of State spoke to this.

Would you like to give us an update on that?

Mr. THOMAS. We have information, which the Senator is well aware of, you have seen it yourself, that certain people in Nicaragua have been involved with, at a minimum, facilitating narcotics trafficking, primarily cocaine, through Nicaragua, probably destined to the United States.

More graphic evidence indicates that an aircraft parked at a military base outside of Managua was allowed to land, be loaded with cocaine, and that evidence is pretty good, that various individuals linked to the Sandinista Government had involvement. I can only speculate as to the motives of the Sandinista government on

this, but it would seem to me, that given the evidence, there must have been a fairly good understanding of what was taking place.

Senator HAWKINS. Are these the pictures that we are talking about?

Mr. THOMAS. Those appear to be pictures that——

Senator HAWKINS. This shows Frederico Vaughan, who is described as the "right hand man" of Interior Minister Borge loading cocaine on an American bound C-123 transport plane at Los Brazilias military airport in Nicaragua, and a Nicaraguan soldier can be seen in the background, here. We interdicted this aircraft. It is in the United States. The trial will be held in Miami.

But these officials have been identified. Here is a picture that was inside the aircraft. The fuel pump broke and they had to load it with buckets but it was Russian fuel.

Mr. THOMAS. Senator, I would say that we were not all that surprised with the potential Nicaraguan connection. The Nicaraguans I think undoubtedly took a lesson from their big brother, the Cubans, and we have ample evidence that Cuban officials have been involved in the same kinds of facilitation of drug trafficking.

Senator DODD. Well, Mr. Thomas, you would certainly suggest that this is not unique to Nicaragua and to Cuba. We find friendly countries, with government officials, as you have already testified, deeply involved in this kind of activity as well.

Mr. THOMAS. Yes. No, and I do not think that there is any attempt on, certainly on the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters to——

Senator HAWKINS. I do not believe they are using government facilities. I hope not. I mean, in some cases they may but as far as I——

Mr. THOMAS. Certainly, in Bolivia——

Senator HAWKINS. They have not used a military airport. They have not been protected.

Mr. THOMAS. In Bolivia, in the late 1970's, under the Garcia Mesa regime, in 1980, there was a government implication.

Senator DODD. Not unique at all.

Mr. THOMAS. It is not necessarily unique, but I would find that in these two cases, that it was rather obvious, particularly given the public stances that these countries have taken on that issue.

Senator DODD. Do not misunderstand me. I find it deplorable as well, but I find it somewhat disingenuous, that we only seem to focus lately, in some cases, on the Nicaraguan-Cuban linkage in these things. There are other countries, as you pointed out already, which have serious problems in this regard, which we do not have the kind of antagonistic political relationship we do, that we have presently with Nicaragua and Cuba. I think that is important to make clear.

Mr. THOMAS. I agree.

Senator HAWKINS. But I must say that it is my observation that in a dictatorship, or a tightly controlled government such as Cuba, that nothing goes on there without the approval of the highest ranking officer.

And here, we have had witnesses at this table, telling us about the "morality of death" pact signed by Nicaragua's Defense Minister, Umberto Ortega, and Raoul Castro, the Defense Minister of

Cuba, initiating Nicaragua's role in drug trafficking. They felt it is all right because their children are not exposed. It is somebody else's children, not in their country.

Now we have witnesses to that and I must say we have interdicted a lot of the product, and they exchange it for guns, according to witnesses that we have had before this subcommittee.

So it is not suprising, no. It is deplorable. I would like to ask you, Mr. Thomas, when we talk about Mexico, your report card shows they have increased the planting of opium poppy. Is that correct?

Mr. THOMAS. That is correct. The report card would also indicate that the amount of eradication, the number of opium fields eradicated has also increased.

Senator HAWKINS. Senator Dodd asked you about Pakistan. I visited there and was absolutely fascinated by the mothers who were rioting in two of the cities there demanding tighter drug control, and as a result of that, in 2 years of negotiations with President Zia, he signed the death penalty in Pakistan for narcotics trafficking.

I see that Pakistan is still the key because of their geographic location, but you made reference to the continued effectiveness.

Is it a result of the escalating domestic heroin addiction problem in Pakistan or is it because of this stipulation, you feel, in the Hawkins-Rangel amendment?

Mr. THOMAS. Well, there is no doubt that the Pakistan Government, beginning in 1979, took a very firm step to do something about the opium production in that country.

And the very much diminished amount of opium now being produced in Pakistan is primarily in the Northwest Frontier Province and there are new projects going into place, one of them under the auspices of the U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control, which we believe will basically, for all intents and purposes, reduce opium production in Pakistan down to a very small amount over the next few years.

Pakistan has suffered from increasing drug abuse, as many countries around the world are beginning to see, and this is a phenomenon that has surprised many of these countries, where one day they do not appear to have much of a drug abuse problem, a couple of years later they have a staggering problem.

We have various estimates of the number of heroin addicts in Pakistan, but it is safe to say it is very high, and I would say that that is spurring, and certainly has been a very effective, had a very strong effect on Pakistan's continuing commitment to their narcotics control effects.

Senator HAWKINS. Has the new emphasis by the United States, on encouraging European involvement in coca control programs in South America, and on the special development and enforcement project in Pakistan, been successful, in your opinion?

Mr. THOMAS. Increasingly successfuly. We now find that European, particularly European governments, are looking at ways to expand their international efforts in the narcotics area.

There are increased contributions to the U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control, including from countries that had not been significant contributors in the past. We also find that the issue of narcotics control has become a political one in Europe. It is a key agenda

item of the European Community session this year. It is frequently discussed in the other regional political bodies in Europe, as well as on a bilateral and independent basis by European governments.

So we recognize, we see their growing concern, and we are working with them closely to try and encourage them to channel that concern into narcotics control programs, two of them which will take place in Peru and Bolivia, under the United Nations, primarily financed, exclusively financed in this case by the Government of Italy, some $40 million worth of contributions, and it will be very effective in that region, to demonstrate that there really is international concern over the narcotics production problem, and that the international community is willing to do something about it, including dedicating resources.

Senator HAWKINS. Is Japan doing anything about it, in their sphere of influence?

Mr. THOMAS. Japan has made contributions to the U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control.

Senator HAWKINS. How much?

Mr. THOMAS. A few hundred thousand dollars, I believe this year.

Senator HAWKINS. How much did the United States give?

Mr. THOMAS. Four hundred thousand from Japan.

Senator HAWKINS. $400,000 from the rich country of Japan. What did the United States contribute?

Mr. THOMAS. $2.5 million.

Senator HAWKINS. $2.5 million. Is the State Department putting any pressure on Japan to give more money to this international program?

Mr. THOMAS. We have encouraged Japan to look at ways to increase their efforts in this region, and in fact, one of the more interesting developments is the increasing interest in the Southeast Asian nations to do something more on a regional basis, and I would ask that Japan look at ways that they might become more involved with that process.

Senator HAWKINS. Does Saudi Arabia give you money?

Mr. THOMAS. Yes.

Senator HAWKINS. How much?

Mr. THOMAS. $1.2 million to the United Nations.

Senator HAWKINS. Now it seems that we could sit down and have a chat with Japan just on this single issue.

Mr. THOMAS. I believe, as we call it, the "donor initiative," as we have titled it, is focused on encouraging all developed, or wealthy nations to do much more in this area, and it is not just to obtain resources, although that is an important segment of it. It is also to demonstrate that there is a very broad-based international political, as well as economic commitment to solving this problem, and this initiative we have undertaken is beginning to pay off in dividends, and increased involvement that we have every intention of strengthening and accelerating that initiative.

Senator HAWKINS. I have some other questions for you, Mr. Thomas, which I will submit, and any Senator who is a member of this subcommittee will have the same opportunity for 24 hours, and thank you for participating with us. I have enjoyed working with you and I think your title alone tells us that it is an interna-

tional matter, that it cannot be controlled by the United States alone. I look forward to working with you.

Mr. THOMAS. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Senator HAWKINS. Our next witness is Jack Lawn, who is the Acting Director of the Drug Enforcement Administration.

There is probably no one in the Government today, more knowledgeable and capable in the field of drug control than Jack Lawn.

The contribution of Mr. Lawn and his agency to this Narcotics Control Strategy Report are invaluable and we look forward to hearing from you in detail. Welcome, Jack, we are pleased to have you and your people with us today.

Do you have a statement for the record? We can submit your entire statement, if you have a brief statement.

Mr. LAWN. I have a statement which I will submit for the record but with your permission, Madam Chairman, I do have a brief statement.

Senator HAWKINS. Go ahead.

STATEMENT OF JOHN C. LAWN, ACTING ADMINISTRATOR, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION

Mr. LAWN. I would like to acknowledge, first, Madam Chairman, that this is my first appearance before a subcommittee in my current role as Acting Administrator, and I think it most appropriate that it be before your subcommittee because of the substantial influence that you have had in drug abuse control, and therefore, it is a unique privilege for me to be here this morning.

The Drug Enforcement Administration has worked closely with the Department of State in the preparation of this report and we fully concur with its philosophical thrust and major conclusions.

Therefore, I want to devote my time today to a discussion of the current world drug situation as it affects the United States, including the significant accomplishments of the past year as well as the areas of difficulty.

Regarding Southwest Asia, Southwest Asia has been the primary supplier of heroin to the United States during the 1980's.

In 1984, Southwest Asian opium production declined sharply, largely because of the abrupt disruption of the poppy harvest in Afghanistan. Cultivation in Iran apparently continued at the level of the past 4 years, while Pakistani production decreased slightly. Despite this sharp reduction in the regional opium harvest, however, Southwest Asian opium and heroin remain readily available in source and consumer countries.

Furthermore, the smaller 1984 crop reportedly has caused the price of opium to rise, thereby encouraging farmers to expand their poppy plantings for the spring harvest.

The Government of Pakistan with assistance from the United States, and from other foreign donors, has been successful in its effort to gradually curtail opium production.

The significant reduction of the Afghan opium crop in 1984 was due to the combination of bad weather and the ongoing insurrection.

Preliminary reports suggest, however, that opium production could increase again in 1985, largely due to the higher prices paid

for opium. Much of the opium produced in Southwest Asia never leaves that area. Pakistan, with over 200,000 heroin addicts and at least 300,000 opium abusers, and Iran, with an estimated 100,000 heroin addicts and 500,000 opium users, together, probably consume more opiates than they produce.

But Afghanistan, with a relatively small drug abuse problem, more than covers the regional opiate shortfall. We believe that the drug source and transit countries of Southwest Asia and the Middle East, with whom the United States has good relations, and where DEA and INM accordingly have been able to work closely with their counterparts, have made and continue to make laudable progress in their battles against the drug problem.

Similar conditions of cooperation and dedication prevail in Turkey. The real problems for the immediate future, however, like in those countries—Iran, Afghanistan, Syria, and Lebanon—where, for various reasons, the United States has little or no influence.

In Southeast Asia. I would like to comment on the area of Southeast Asia where we expect another bumper opium crop in 1985. Burma remains the largest opium producer and Thailand the primary conduit for the Golden Triangle opiates destined for international markets.

Despite considerably increased enforcement efforts by both the Royal Thai Government and the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma against narcotics refineries and major trafficking organizations during the past 3 years, there have been only temporary disruptions of the regional narcotics trade.

In Thailand, Hong Kong, and Malaysia, which are the major consumer and transit countries for the Golden Triangle opiates, record seizure of Southeast Asian heroin has been made without reducing availability or raising prices.

This means that Southeast Asian heroin availability in the United States will probably remain at the present level, and possibily may increase during 1985.

Approximately 90 percent of the Southeast Asian opium is produced in Burma. The principal problem in controlling opiate production and trafficking in Burma is that most of the poppy growing and refining areas lie beyond the Rangoon Government's control.

Opiate smuggling generally is conducted by well-armed insurgent forces, most notably the Burmese Communist Party and the Shan United Army.

The Royal Thai Government has conducted repeated attacks against the narcotics refineries and major insurgent trafficking organizations along the north Thailand-Burma border.

These operations successfully disrupted refining activities, inflicted severe losses on the traffickers, and denied the trafficking organizations a safe haven on Thai soil.

However, because of the availability of the trafficking organizations to regroup, and to resume operations, there have been only temporary impacts on the regional drug trade.

Latin America. The third major source area, Latin America, is a significant supplier of several types of drugs. It provides approximately 85 percent of the marijuana, a large share, approximately 37 percent of the heroin, and is the source of all of the cocaine consumed in the United States.

During 1984, there were substantial changes with respect to the roles played by several of the countries in the region, most notably Colombia and Mexico.

Colombian agencies have had disruptive effects on marijuana and cocaine trafficking groups in Colombia. Herbicidal eradication of marijuana, begun for the first time in July 1984, ultimately removed 3400 hectares from cultivation, through December 1984.

This, together with the impressive bulk seizures by the national police, totalling 3300 metric tons in 1984, resulted in the removal of more than half of the elicit crop from the market, and caused the export price to increase by approximately 50 percent.

Significantly, Colombia's share of the United States 'marijuana imports is estimated to have fallen from 66 percent in 1983 to about 48 percent in 1984.

Colombian authorities have adopted other measures to disrupt the flow of cocaine to the United Sates. Limits have been placed on the importation of chemicals essential to the refining process.

Three major processing complexes, as well as numerous lesser facilities, have been confiscated. By the end of 1984, Colombian forces had seized and destroyed over 18,000 kilograms of cocaine hydrochloride, and cocaine base. Combined with seizures of nearly 14,000 kilograms in the United States and several thousand kilograms in international transit, this resulted in a reversal of the 2-year trend of falling cocaine prices.

Significant changes also have been detected in other cocaine-producing countries. The existence of commercial scale coca cultivation has been confirmed in Ecuador. The Government of Ecuador has effectively responded with an eradication program.

While Peru does not appear to have entered the cocaine hydrochloride processing stage of the business on a large scale, its cultivation of coca has expanded to the point where it is now believed to be the dominant coca source. The Government of Peru's efforts to eradicate coca cultivation and institute crop substitution have been brutally opposed by trafficker and guerrilla attacks.

While Bolivia's performance with respect to eradication and control in the principal cultivation zones has been decidedly lackluster, interdiction and investigative groups last year raided and destroyed four large-scale cocaine hydrochloride laboratories and their associated airstrips.

Unfortunately, much of Colombia's success could be offset by increased marijuana production in Mexico. Seizures in Chihuahua in November of 1984 revealed a high degree of organization, planning, and boldness on the part of the Mexican traffickers. The impact on the United States/Mexican border is notable. Total cocaine seizures increased from 27 metric tons in 1983 to 102 metric tons in 1984, while the average seizure size increased from 27 kilograms to 73 kilograms.

While some of this change may be attributable to improved enforcement, the magnitude of the increases suggests a deterioration in the effectiveness of Mexico's eradication program.

Similarly, Mexican opium production has increased, as has its availability in the United States. Controlling the drug problem from foreign source countries is a long-term and difficult proposi-

tion, often dependent upon conditions beyond the control of the United States.

While we work to develop effective drug control mechanisms in foreign sources, we must accelerate our efforts toward achieving those elements of the drug control strategy within our own grasp, including continued vigorous pursuit of a strong law enforcement program, and the fullest possible support towards helping our citizens reduce the demand for drugs.

Thank you for this opportunity and I am happy to respond to any questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lawn follows:]

STATEMENT OF

JOHN C. LAWN

Acting Administrator

Drug Enforcement Administration

on

International Drug Production

before

Subcommittee on Alcoholism and
Drug Abuse

United States Senate

Senator Paula Hawkins, Chairman

March 13, 1985

Good morning, Madame Chairman and members of the Subcommittee on Alcoholism and Drug Abuse. I would like to thank you for this opportunity to testify today concerning the 1985 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. The Drug Enforcement Administration has worked closely with the Department of State in the preparation of this report, and we fully concur with its philosophical thrust and major conclusions. Therefore, I want to devote my time today to a discussion of the current world drug situation as it affects the United States, including the significant accomplishments of the past year, as well as the remaining areas of difficulty. I will address, in turn, the three major regions of the world -- Southwest Asia, Southeast Asia, and Latin America -- where illicit drug production and trafficking are centered.

Southwest Asia

Southwest Asia has been the primary supplier of heroin to the United States during the 1980's. In 1984, Southwest Asian opium production declined sharply, largely because of the abrupt disruption of the poppy harvest in Afghanistan. Cultivation in Iran apparently continued at the level of the past four years, while Pakistani production decreased slightly. Despite this sharp reduction in the regional opium harvest, however, Southwest Asian opium and heroin remain readily available in source and consumer countries. Furthermore, the smaller 1984 crop reportedly has caused the price of opium to rise, thereby encouraging farmers to expand their poppy plantings for the spring harvest.

The Government of Pakistan with assistance from the United States and

other foreign donors, has been successful in its effort to gradually curtail opium production. While further reductions in 1985 and beyond certainly are feasible, there are several factors beyond the control of the government -- including weather, opium prices, and resistance by some of the key tribal groups -- that could delay the ultimate elimination of opium poppy cultivation in Pakistan.

The significant reduction in the Afghan opium crop in 1984 was due to a combination of bad weather and the ongoing insurrection. Preliminary reports suggest, however, that opium production could increase again in 1985, largely due to the higher prices paid for opium.

In Iran, the long war with Iraq, the rebellion by elements of the Kurdish minority, economic stagnation, and a large and growing opiate addict population are believed to have maintained opium production at the level of 400-600 tons.

Much of the opium produced in Southwest Asia never leaves the area. Pakistan, with over 200,000 heroin addicts and at least 300,000 opium abusers, and Iran, with an estimated 100,000 heroin addicts and one half million opium users, together probably consume more opiates than they produce. But Afghanistan, with a relatively small drug abuse problem, more than covers the regional opiate shortfall.

The opium produced in Southwest Asia is refined into heroin at clandestine laboratories in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, India, Turkey, Syria, and probably Lebanon. The most important of these heroin source

countries are Pakistan, where three heroin laboratories were confiscated last year, and Afghanistan. One measure of the increasing effectiveness of Pakistan's drug enforcement agencies is that laboratory operators in the North-West Frontier Province have been forced during the past two years to relocate their facilities to more remote areas of the province or across the border to Afghanistan.

Large quantities of heroin from the Afghanistan/Pakistan border area transit Pakistan, which has seized nearly two metric tons annually for the past three years. From there opium and heroin are smuggled to or through India, Iran, the Persian Gulf States, the Middle East, and Nigeria, before reaching the consumers in Western Europe and North America.

In addition to their opiate production and trafficking roles, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Afghanistan are significant suppliers of hashish to the United States. Morocco also is a major hashish producer, but most of its output is either consumed domestically or shipped to Europe.

We believe that the drug source and transit countries of Southwest Asia and the Middle East with whom the United States has good relations and where DEA and INM accordingly have been able to work closely with their counterparts, have made and continue to make laudable progress in their battles against the drug problem. In Pakistan, the poppy acreage reductions, heroin seizures, and laboratory confiscations previously noted, as well as significant improvements in enforcement capability

have been accomplished in the face of tremendous difficulties. Similar conditions of cooperation and dedication prevail in Turkey. The real problems for the immediate future, however, lie in those countries -- Iran, Afghanistan, Syria, and Lebanon -- where for various reasons the United States has little or no influence.

Southeast Asia

I now would like to comment on Southeast Asia, where we expect another bumper opium poppy crop in 1985. Burma remains the largest opium producer and Thailand the primary conduit for Golden Triangle opiates destined for international markets. Despite considerably increased enforcement efforts by both the Royal Thai Government (RTG) and the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma (SRUB) against narcotics refineries and major trafficking organizations during the past three years, there have been only temporary disruptions of the regional narcotics trade. In Thailand, Hong Kong, and Malaysia, which are the major consumer and transit countries for Golden Triangle opiates, record seizures of Southeast Asian heroin have been made without reducing availability or raising prices. This means that Southeast Asian heroin availability in the United States probably will remain at the present level, and possibly may increase, during 1985.

Approximately 90 percent of Southeast Asia's opium is produced in Burma. The principal problem in controlling opiate production and trafficking in Burma is that most of the poppy growing and refining areas lie beyond the Rangoon government's control. Opiate smuggling generally is

conducted by well-armed insurgent forces, most notably the Burmese Communist Party and the Shan United Army. Opium is the primary source of revenue for insurgents in Burma. Limited manual poppy eradication carried out in areas under the government's control and periodic military raids against narcotic refineries along the Burma/Thailand border have not had a significant or lasting impact. The current SRUB government has neither the military capability nor the necessary resources to conduct more effective eradication or suppression operations.

Although the SRUB is contemplating aerial herbicidal eradication, the mountainous terrain occupied by the large, well-armed insurgent forces and hostile ethnic minority groups render such actions difficult and, at best, risky. Further, the SRUB currently does not possess an Air Force sufficient to carry out such operations in communist-controlled territories. Prior successful eradication efforts in SRUB-controlled or contested areas, has moved the cultivation to insurgent-controlled areas. The SRUB does not receive significant United States or internationally sponsored agricultural assistance or strategic development programs to help the farmers and hill tribes to find alternative sources of income. Thus, even if widespread eradication of what is now the farmers' only reliable cash crop could be accomplished, the resulting popular resentment might then engender a more serious insurgency problem.

Some Thai government officials have expressed concern regarding the possible influx of Shan State refugees from Burma, should an effective

opium eradication program be undertaken there. It is feared that this would increase the number of refugees who would settle in Thailand, destroy forests, and engage in poppy cultivation.

The Royal Thai Government has conducted repeated attacks against narcotics refineries and major insurgent/trafficking organizations along the North Thailand/Burma border. These operations successfully disrupted refining activities, inflicted severe losses on the traffickers, and denied the trafficking organizations a safe haven on Thai soil. However, because of the ability of the trafficking organizations to regroup and resume operations, there have been only temporary impacts on the regional drug trade.

As a result of these enforcement actions, alternative transportation routes are being used more frequently. There is growing evidence that considerable amounts of narcotics move south through Burma along the coast, both overland and by sea, to southern Thailand and Malaysia for conversion in heroin refineries along the Thailand/Malaysia border and in Penang. Additionally, several other routes through Burma into India have been identified. These routes also are used to bring large quantities of precursor chemicals back to the refineries in the communist-controlled sections of the Shan State and along the Burma/Thailand border.

The approximate 40 to 50 metric tons of opium produced in Thailand is consumed locally. Poppy cultivation and opium production in Thailand have been and probably will remain dependent primarily on the weather

and the price of opium. Although the RTG is committed to poppy eradication, and Thailand has a crop substitution and assistance program for the hill tribe growers, crop substitution thus far has had limited success because of the hill tribes' reluctance to switch to less profitable cash crops.

Latin America

The third major source area, Latin America, is a significant supplier of several types of drugs. It provides approximately 85% of the marijuana, a large share --37%-- of the heroin, and is the source of all of the cocaine consumed in the United States. During 1984 there were substantial changes with respect to the roles played by several of the countries in the region, most notably Colombia and Mexico.

Traditionally, Colombia has dominated both the cocaine and the marijuana traffic to the United States. While this remains essentially true today, the combined actions of United States authorities and selected Colombian agencies have had disruptive effects on marijuana and cocaine trafficking groups in Colombia. Herbicidal eradication of marijuana, begun for the first time in July, 1984, ultimately removed 3,400 hectares from cultivation through December 1984. This, together with the impressive bulk seizures by the National Police totalling 3,300 metric tons in 1984, resulted in the removal of more than half of the illicit crop from the market and caused the export price to increase by 50 percent. Significantly, Colombia's share of U.S. marijuana imports is estimated to have fallen from 66 percent in 1983 to about 48 percent in 1984.

While no effective eradication program has yet been directed at the coca bush, Colombian authorities have adopted other measures to disrupt the flow of cocaine to the United States. Limits have been placed on the importation of chemicals essential to the refining process. Three major processing complexes, as well as numerous lesser facilities, were confiscated. By the end of 1984, Colombian forces had seized and destroyed over 18,000 kilograms of cocaine hydrochloride and base. Combined with seizures of nearly 14,000 kilograms in the United States and several thousand kilograms in international transit, this resulted in a reversal of the two-year trend of falling cocaine prices. Wholesale prices of cocaine hydrochloride, which had dropped as low as $4,000 to $7,000 per kilogram in Colombia, increased to the $8,000 to $10,000 range, while Miami wholesale prices rose from a low of $16,000 to about $35,000 per kilogram.

Events in Colombia, including major cocaine seizures, a growing domestic cocaine product abuse problem in the form of basuco, the Government of Colombia reaction to the assassination of the Minister of Justice, the control of essential chemicals, and the extradition of narcotics violators, have disrupted international cocaine trafficking and caused the Colombian traffickers, who still control the principal smuggling networks to the United States, to modify their operations. The traffickers have sponsored coca cultivation in contiguous countries and have tried to establish major laboratory complexes in both Panama and Venezuela. Recent seizures confirm that traffickers have established cocaine conversion laboratories in Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Mexico and even the United States.

Significant changes also have been detected in other cocaine producing countries. The existence of commercial-scale coca cultivation has been confirmed in Ecuador. The Government of Ecuador has effectively responded with an eradication program. While Peru does not appear to have entered the cocaine hydrochloride processing stage of the business on a large scale, its cultivation of coca has expanded to the point where it is now believed to be the dominant coca source. The Government of Peru's efforts to eradicate coca cultivation and institute crop substitution have been brutally opposed by trafficker and guerilla attacks.

Bolivia seems to be developing a large-scale hydrochloride processing capability in order both to supply the United States consumers and, in concert with Argentine, Brazilian, and Chilean groups, to develop and service a rapidly growing European market. While Bolivia's performance with respect to eradication and control in the principal cultivation zones has been decidedly lackluster, interdiction and investigative groups last year raided and destroyed four large scale cocaine hydrochloride laboratories and their associated airstrips. This resulted in the arrest of over 30 persons, including a Colombian chemist, and the removal of more than 600 kilograms of cocaine base and hydrochloride.

Unfortunately, much of Colombia's success could be offset by increased marihuana production in Mexico. Seizures in Chihuahua in November, 1984 revealed a high degree of organization, planning and boldness on the part of the Mexican traffickers. The impact at the United States/Mexico

border is notable: total marijuana seizures increased from 27 metric tons in 1983 to 102 metric tons in 1984, while the average seizure size increased from 27 kilograms to 73 kilograms. While some of this change may be attributable to improved enforcement, the magnitude of the increases suggests a deterioration in the effectiveness of Mexico's eradication campaign.

Similarly, Mexican opium production has increased, as has its availability in the United States. DEA estimated that, after allowing for seizures and eradication, Mexico provided 1.62 metric tons of heroin to the United States in 1984. This constitutes 36 to 38 percent of the estimated 4.2 to 4.5 metric tons consumed here last year.

In conclusion, I believe my testimony today has demonstrated the flexibility of drug producers and traffickers. If one source area, smuggling route or method is disrupted, alternative means are quickly developed. This does not make the task of drug enforcement officials impossible, but it does greatly increase the scale and complexity of the problem.

Obviously, long-term success in reducing drug abuse depends upon effective programs to reduce the availability of drugs at their source and to reduce the demand for drugs in the United States. Controlling the drug problem from foreign source countries is a long-term and difficult proposition, often dependent upon conditions beyond the control of the United States. While we work to develop effective drug control mechanisms in foreign sources, we must accelerate our efforts

toward achieving those elements of the drug control strategy within our grasp, including continued vigorous pursuit of a strong law enforcement program and the fullest possible support towards helping our citizens reduce the demand for drugs.

Again, thank you for this opportunity to appear before your subcommittee. I will be happy to respond to any questions you might have.

Senator HAWKINS. Thank you, Mr. Lawn. The Government of Mexico last year seized and destroyed 10,000 tons of cocaine, and a lab operated by 7,000 slave labor Mexicans. In the bust, no major traffickers were arrested, and in the past 8 years, no major Mexican traffickers have been arrested. Why, in your opinion?

Mr. LAWN. As you indicated, Madam Chairman, in the 10,000 ton marijuana seizure, that 10,000 ton seizure was just on one site. When the information was developed by the Drug Enforcement Administration as to this massive area of cultivation, the information was initially given to local law enforcement authorities within that particular State.

When no action was taken, the information was then brought to Mexico City and it was presented to the Office of the Attorney General. Then action was taken.

However, the campesino who cooperated when enforcement authorities arrived at that particular site, indicated that they were told several hours before the raiding parties actually arrived, that the raiding parties were coming. I think it is without question, that the reason that this was allowed to happen is because of the corruption factor.

Senator HAWKINS. Do you believe that there is a coverup in the Camarena case?

Mr. LAWN. I believe, in reference to the abduction and the killing of special agent Enrique Camarena, there was initial inertia in that investigation, which inertia, from my perspective as a professional law enforcement officer, cannot be explained short of the fact that there must have been a corrupting influence.

Senator HAWKINS. Do we know any more about the circumstances today, than we did last week, when we knew his body had been buried in one place and taken and put on the ranch, later?

Mr. LAWN. We continue to receive updated information but as far as the ultimate targets of the investigation, no Madam Chairman, we do not have any updated information.

Senator HAWKINS. And I read in the paper, that the Mexican officials are baffled by the United States' criticism of the case.

Mr. LAWN. Yes; I have read that, too, and I am baffled at the fact that they are baffled, because we have lost an individual dedicated to this war, and during my many years in law enforcement, I never had anything more difficult to do than to present the flag which draped that young man's coffin to his mother, last Saturday, when in fact several years before she had received another flag from her other son who had been killed as a Marine in Vietnam.

Senator HAWKINS. It is a war, then in your opinion?

Mr. LAWN. Absolutely.

Senator HAWKINS. And you will pursue that with the Mexican Government?

Mr. LAWN. Yes; we are actively pursuing that investigation. We are already discussing new initiatives which must be taken and we plan to continue to discuss these initiatives with the Attorney General.

Senator HAWKINS. I stay in touch with that case constantly. In your opinion, as the new Drug Enforcement Administrator—did the pressure we put on the border, have an effect in making the Mexican Government more responsive?

Mr. LAWN. In my opinion, it had a most notable positive effect, for a number of reasons. First, we learned initially, after the abduction of special agent Camarena, that major drug traffickers were being allowed to leave areas where we knew they were located, and had asked Mexican authorities to detain and question them.

We also knew that these individuals had documentation which could allow them to enter the United States. We felt that at least we could control their coming into the United States by placing pressure at the borders.

Senator HAWKINS. No; it is not really pressure. I think you get a better inspection coming through the Miami airport than you do walking across the border. I mean, all this pressure I read about is not pressure. It is just doing your job in a concentrated manner, being a little more thorough about it, in my opinion. I do not mean to interrupt you.

Mr. LAWN. Well, I would agree with you. As recently as last Saturday, while I was in California for the funeral services, we talked to agent personnel who are hearing substantial information, that because of the pressure brought to bear at the border, there are major stockpiles of heroin and marijuana waiting in Tijuana to be transported across our land borders.

It is also important to recognize, that with the increase in marijuana production in Mexico, and the increase in heroin production, a substantial portion of both the marijuana and heroin coming in to the United States comes across our land borders, not by aircraft but by trucks.

Senator HAWKINS. Well, if you recall, at the Western Hemisphere Conference on narcotic control, the Canadians were very concerned about this also.

Mr. LAWN. Yes.

Senator HAWKINS. They brought four representatives, and are an active partner, now, in this war. Who called off the border inspection, considering the fact we do not know anymore today than we did when we called it off?

Did the Mexican Government put pressure on us, the United States, or did the United States decide—did they say that it was more diplomatic to take off the——

Mr. LAWN. I am sorry, Madam Chairman. I am not aware why it was called off. As recently as yesterday, I called Mr. Von Raab of Customs to thank him for the support that he gave us, which we felt had an immediate and positive effect on our investigation.

Senator HAWKINS. Well, all you did was get the body, as far as I am concerned, and went to a funeral.

Mr. LAWN. Well, more than that.

Senator HAWKINS. And killed several peasants.

Mr. LAWN. More than that. For the first 72 hours of that investigation, or the first 72 hours after the abduction, there was an inertia on the part of the Mexican authority to initiate any investigation.

Senator HAWKINS. Oh, I know that, and your predecessor had to go down there and bang on their desks. Are you prepared to do that as the new Drug Enforcement Administrator, to go in to every country and bang on their desks?

Mr. LAWN. Yes; I am prepared to do whatever needs be done, so that we can resolve the Camarena case.

Senator HAWKINS. Is that not rather demeaning for a great country like the United States, to have the Drug Enforcement Administrator go down and bang on somebody's desk?

Mr. LAWN. I think, if nothing else, the travel of Mr. Mullin to Guadalajara, indicated that this was something more than a police-to-police misunderstanding, that this in fact was a message from the highest representatives of the U.S. Government, that such conduct in the abduction of a citizen of the United States will not be tolerated.

Senator HAWKINS. But the Mexicans did not get the message, because they are baffled, according to this article. I would say we owe a great debt of gratitude to Mr. Mullin, who constantly is being threatened with being kidnaped and murdered by the Colombian drug traffickers. He is one of those that is targeted. I imagine that this transferred to you at this point in time.

I do not know that we ever intended for that responsibility to be on our law enforcement officials who are doing their job, and going a step beyond their job, if indeed you have to work around the diplomacy in the State Department. I feel that we owe a lot to you, to protect you, and to also assist you when you find yourselves in this position. I feel like you: This is the beginning of many incidents when they are stockpiling it on the other side of the land border.

There is more security and more inspection coming in these buildings here than there is down there on the border.

It seems to me that we have the responsibility to send a loud, strong message, and you know I will continue to do that and I will urge my colleagues to support that.

When I was in Burma, the head of the government there told me they lose 100 soldiers a month in the war on drugs. It is an active, shooting war. He commented that they could be much more effective if they could get the cooperation of Thailand, even though they are in an isolated kind of government, the Burmese, that they need to have more border control.

When we are talking about a Mexican-American border, if you have been to see the Burma-Thai border, it is like a jungle, very heavily overgrown, with trees and a lot of tropical growth. At the same time, it was wide open. You could just walk across it. And we watched. We were in helicopters. We just watched people walking back and forth. And I asked the Burmese official who is leading the war, and he said "Kuhn Sah," who is the big warlord there for drugs. I said, "Where is he?" He said, "One foot Thailand, one foot Burma." It seems to me that they could get Kuhn Sah at the border, if indeed we work with these countries to be vigilant on their border.

Now, is that any of your responsibility in the war on drugs, to give some international training, assistance, whatever they need, as the Drug Enforcement Administrator for this country?

Mr. LAWN. Yes, Madam Chairman. That would certainly fall within the purview of our responsibility. We have worked very closely with the Government of Thailand.

The Government of Thailand itself is also recognizing the substantial refugee problem they are facing, with the refugees coming from Burma and——

Senator HAWKINS. Vietnam.

Mr. LAWN. And while it would be difficult for me to predict, I would say that the future cooperation between Burma and Thailand is most critical in that effort.

Senator HAWKINS. What should we do about Malaysia, in your opinion?

Mr. LAWN. We have spoken with personnel in Malaysia. We have introduced the Malaysian Government to our chemical control program, which they were very impressed with. They have asked us to send representatives to Malaysia, to discuss with them how they could initiate a program with acetic anhydride. We are optimistic that we will see greater results coming from Malaysia.

Senator HAWKINS. Are they willing to trace the acetic anhydride?

Mr. LAWN. They have indicated that there is a willingness there; yes.

Senator HAWKINS. I spoke to President de la Madrid about doing that in Mexico. Are they cooperating with us on tracing the acetic anhydride into Mexico?

Mr. LAWN I am not sure, Madam Chairman. I will find out.

Senator HAWKINS. Is that not important, when they share a 2,000-mile border with us?

Mr. LAWN. I think it is important, but different from the chemical control program with ethyl ether, which is critical in the final stage of cocaine base to cocaine hydrochloride. Acetic anhydride has a great many uses other than the conversion, and it is a more difficult chemical to track.

Senator HAWKINS. But it is obvious, if a country is importing 10 times more than their normal usage?

Mr. LAWN. Yes; it is.

Senator HAWKINS. Can you comment on production and/or trafficking in Lebanon?

Mr. LAWN. Trafficking and production have increased in Lebanon and in Syria. As I have indicated in my initial brief statement, it is one of those areas where the United States has no control, and we are seeing substantial increases.

Senator HAWKINS. Is there a relationship between narcotics trafficking and the PLO?

Mr. LAWN. In the relationship between terrorist groups and trafficking?

Senator HAWKINS. What role does India play?

Mr. LAWN. India will play, I think, an increasing role in the trafficking in opium. We have seen increases and I think we will continue to see increases coming from India.

Senator HAWKINS. We have commended President Betancur of Colombia many times. Do you see consistent efforts on the part of Colombia to continue its "war without quarter," as he calls it?

Mr. LAWN. Yes; I do. I traveled to Colombia several weeks ago, I met with General Delgado, and will in fact be meeting with him again later this afternoon. I am personally convinced that their commitment is real, that their commitment is sustained.

They have invited me back within the year, and have told me that when I return, there will not be a marijuana problem in Colombia. I have put that on my calendar and I intend to make that visit.

Senator HAWKINS. Whenever I meet with the U.S. enforcement agents abroad, they have told me, without exceptions, that it is vital that the Mansfield amendment be repealed. In its present interpretation, U.S. agents have been prohibited from being present during narcotics arrests, and in their opinion, seriously undermines agent morale, their effectiveness and the confidence.

Would you oppose an amendment to the Mansfield language, which would provide exceptions, where the host country and the U.S. Ambassador agree, that the presence of U.S. officials in narcotics actions would be helpful?

Mr. LAWN. This question was posed by the President's Commission on Organized Crime. At that time my response was that I was not aware that there was substantial dissatisfaction with Mansfield, and as recently as yesterday, the question was posed by the Attorney General, and I responded the same way, but based upon your inquiry, I will make further inquiries.

Senator HAWKINS. I have a list of agents that you could call. It is unanimous, and I do not believe that that was ever the intention of the amendment.

In your opinion, have Colombian hit squads entered the United States?

Mr. LAWN. We have received information that persons have been sent to target officials in the United States, but we have not substantiated any of that information, and, in point of fact, we have received information from individuals which almost verbatim, furnishes information to us which had appeared in a newspaper the day before. So, while we have taken precautionary measures, throughout the agency, throughout the world, we cannot substantiate the fact that this is the case.

We watched, as so many of us did, the interview of a major trafficker in Colombia, who talked about his feelings about the United States. Certainly, that individual would be capable of such a thing, but we have no information to substantiate that threat.

Senator HAWKINS. In your opinion, is there a relationship between the Mexican and the Colombian organized crime families?

Mr. LAWN. I think, based upon ongoing investigations, we do see a relationship of convenience between the cocaine traffickers in Colombia and the cocaine traffickers in Mexico.

Senator HAWKINS. Jamaica is a source of 13 percent of the marijuana consumed in the United States. It also receives the most U.S. foreign aid per capita in the world. Have we done an aerial survey of Jamaica?

Mr. LAWN. I am not sure that we have. I think there is one scheduled for this year.

Senator HAWKINS. Do you know when?

Mr. LAWN. I am sorry, Madam Chairman. My information was wrong. We completed one in September of last year. We are doing another this year.

Senator HAWKINS. Is marijuana being cultivated on government land?

Mr. LAWN. Yes; cultivation occurs on public as well as private land.

Senator HAWKINS. How much? Do you have any idea?

Mr. LAWN. I can prepare a response.

Senator HAWKINS. Would you provide it for the record.

Mr. LAWN. For the record; yes.

[The information supplied for the record follows:]

CULTIVATION OF MARIJUANA ON PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LANDS IN JAMAICA

Marijuana is cultivated on both public and private land in Jamaica. While precise estimates do not exist as to the percentage of marihuana grown on each, the aerial surveys and our experience in Jamaica indicate that the larger commercial scale cultivation primarily takes place on public lands. The smaller, independent producers most often use private lands.

Senator HAWKINS. Has Jamaica agreed to spray the marijuana?

Mr. LAWN. Jamaica has agreed to an eradication program.

Senator HAWKINS. When will it begin?

Mr. LAWN. Again, they have begun an eradication program, not a spray program, and as for the number of acres that have been eradicated, again, if I could, I would like to provide that for the record.

Senator HAWKINS. Provide that for the record, please.

[Information supplied for the record follows:]

JAMAICA ERADICATION PROGRAM OF MARIJUANA

While Jamaica has not agreed to an herbicidal eradication program, several key Jamaican officials may visit Colombia in the near future to observe eradication programs there. It is important to point out that the Government of Jamaica has made a strong commitment to a sustained manual eradication program. For example, in 1984, with U.S. funding support, Jamaica manually eradicated 1,090 acres of marijuana, which is approximately 20% of our estimate of the acreage under cultivation. Thus far in 1985 several hundred additional acres have been eradicated and preparation is underway for eradication of the current spring crop.

The Government of Jamaica has also recently brought under military control four significant airstrips which had been primarily used for the transport of marihuana to the U.S.

Senator HAWKINS. I am disturbed with the accuracy, or the reliability of the narcotics production estimate reports delivered to the Congress. This may be a question for Mr. Thomas.

But in the 1983 Narcotics Intelligence Estimate, Mexico was estimated to be producing 1,300 metric tons of marijuana. In 1984, the Government of Mexico seized and destroyed 10,000 metric tons.

During this same time period, the Mexican Government had forbidden the DEA from verifying their crop eradication, is that true?

Mr. LAWN. There was a prohibition on the DEA personnel becoming actively involved in the ground truthing, in the verification. However, in recent discussions with the Government of Mexico, they have agreed to allow DEA to participate in ground truthing.

Senator HAWKINS. Have we done an aerial survey for Mexico?

Mr. LAWN. No; an aerial survey has not been done.

Senator HAWKINS. Why not? Do I ask the State Department?

Mr. LAWN. Well, I am sorry, I do not have that answer but I will furnish that answer for you.

[Information supplied for the record follows:]

AERIAL SURVEY OF MEXICO MARIJUANA CULTIVATION

An aerial survey of Mexico for marijuana cultivation is not presently feasible due to the massive geographic areas over which marijuana can be cultivated in Mexico. This area approximately compares to the western quarter of the United States.

I would also like to further comment regarding the Chihuahua seizure. While the 10,000 MT figure for the Chihuahua seizure is correct, it represents gross weight of whole plants. In terms of the net, marketable yield or useable portion of the plant, the seizure is estimated to have been about 1,900 to 2,400 MT. Also, the NNICC figures represent the net amount of marijuana believed to be available for export, after host country removals to include eradication and bulk seizures. We have long recognized Mexico's overall productive capacity, but most of that produced in any given year is eradicated or seized as was the case in Chihuahua.

Senator HAWKINS. Did the DEA learn anything from the Camarena kidnapping, that would be helpful, if, God forbid, it ever happens again?

Mr. LAWN. Well, certainly in regard to our personnel security, we issued instructions again, after the abduction of Special Agent Camarena. These were instructions which had been issued earlier, and had to be reinforced because of the unfortunate abduction of the special agent.

In addition to what we learned about personnel security, I think we also learned that perhaps the corruption factor, specifically in Guadulajara, was a lot greater than we had anticipated.

Senator HAWKINS. Did we learn anything by being more thorough in our searching of automobiles that came in to this country?

Mr. LAWN. We certainly learned that based upon the intensified search, that the Government of Mexico, we think, took more action to work with us on the abduction of Special Agent Camarena, than they might have taken, had that not occurred.

Senator HAWKINS. Is not all the money we spend for drug eradication and law enforcement wasted, if we do not have the cooperation of the Mexican Government and the Mexican police?

Mr. LAWN. I do not think so. I do not think it is wasted, because even with the problems that we are facing in Mexico, and we are facing increasing problems in Mexico, when DEA developed the information about the area of new cultivation, we did not get an initial response, but when we brought it to the highest authorities in Mexico, we did get a substantial response.

The marijuana was seized, was destroyed. The campesino's who were imprisoned were freed. So I do not think that our efforts in Mexico are fruitless.

Senator HAWKINS. But they have not arrested anyone for the murder?

Mr. LAWN. Not at this point.

Senator HAWKINS. I know you have to go in about 5 minutes. I appreciate your staying. Senator Metzenbaum has joined us again. He has questions for you, I am sure.

Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Mr. Lawn, tell me what the other agents are thinking, doing, saying vis-a-vis the whole question of their own security as a result of this most recent happening.

Mr. LAWN. Concerning their own security, I would have to say that we are in the law enforcement business. We would not accept this profession without being aware that there are risks to be

taken and risks that we must take. There was a considerable concern about threats in Colombia, for example.

I personally traveled to Colombia and spoke to each of our people assigned to Colombia, in order to elicit from them a feeling about their desire to stay in what was a situation where there was some personal risk.

The response was overwhelmingly in favor of their doing the job that they were sent to do. I have found the same thing with the personnel in Mexico. I cannot tell you how many calls I have received personally from agents around the country, indeed, agents around the world, who have volunteered to go to Mexico to take the place of Special Agent Enrique Camarena, to get the job done.

So, while we are concerned for our own safety, our overwhelming interest is in getting the job done, and safety is only a small factor to be weighed.

Senator METZENBAUM. That speaks extremely well for your agents, their courage as well as their dedication to their jobs. But my question also has to do with our responsibility for their safety. And it seems to me—and I am not knowledgeable in this area and that is the reason I am asking you the question—a lone agent, or two agents in Guadulajara, three agents, four agents, small arms, not nearly the kind of arms that, oh, the drug traffickers make available to their own people, come up in an automobile with much stronger weaponry. Probably more personnel than we have in an area.

How do we provide that security? Bravery is one thing. Courage is in the same league. But I am concerned as to how you stop this kind of thing, if the leaders in the drug trafficking arena are determined to take one or more of our agents out.

Mr. LAWN. I too, am concerned, Senator Metzenbaum, and I think the important thing is that we, in 42 foreign countries, are the guest of the host government.

We must expect that the host government will supply the security that we believe is necessary in order for us to perform our function.

If that is not the case—and it has happened in several countries, where this security could not be provided—then it is the determination we must make, that since the security cannot be provided, we cannot keep people in a given country.

Senator METZENBAUM. And are there some countries now, that you are not satisfied with the security that is being provided?

Mr. LAWN. Yes, there are. For example, even in Colombia, with all of the support we are getting in Colombia, there are certain areas of Colombia, where we are not satisfied that our personnel will be secure, and we have moved them from the smaller offices, the one- and two-person offices, to areas where we know they will continue to work at least in pairs.

Senator METZENBAUM. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Senator HAWKINS. Thank you, Senator. I hope you at least give directions to change their habits. It seems that Mr. Camarena was very predictable. He went every day to the same place, or periodically, the same place for lunch.

It seems to me that that would be a new order that would come out of your department, to not be so predictable, because I know, in Colombia, for instance—I am told—that the current going price to kill anybody is $50, 50 U.S. dollars. So, if you have that kind of mentality and a violent society, we cannot be too careful of our people. We are there to help them, and they are helping us, in Colombia, even though the threat is so great.

Mr. LAWN. I would like to say that the important thing, the weekend that Mr. Mullin traveled to Guadulajara, his first stop was to talk to Mrs. Camarena, and Geneva said, "Mr. Mullin, you have to promise me, if nothing else, do not make my husband a number." I think that the concern that we see on the part of this committee, on the part of the Members of Congress, that will not be the case, and I think that is very critical to the security, of not only DEA personnel around the world, but to U.S. citizens around the world.

Senator HAWKINS. I introduced legislation last week to give a $100,000 reward to anyone that gives us information in any country, that would lead to the arrest of the perpetrators of the crime. Would that be helpful to you?

Mr. LAWN. I have not read the language of your bill but when I read——

Senator HAWKINS. If it is any more complicated, I will rewrite it. If you are under budgetary restraints, we took it out of the drug seizure assets, so there is no net cost to you, to your agency.

Mr. LAWN. I think that that would certainly verbalize the message that our personnel are important, and that we, as a country, will not tolerate attacks against our people.

Senator HAWKINS. We appreciate your serving in this administration. You really have been helpful to work with, and in our war against drugs, and drug abuse, it is encouraging to have such capable, competent, dedicated people at the head of these two vital government agencies. The report itself is a remarkable document. I have read it several times. I recommend it to all the Senators. I agree with some things and I have some problems with some others, as you and I have discussed, but it shows how much work we have to do, and I think it demonstrates, vividly, that we are making progress, not necessarily all the same percentage in every country. But I will tell you that the American mothers and fathers are disturbed, they would like some domestic tranquillity. Pakistani mothers were rioting when I was there.

Colombia women, the mothers rioted after Justice Minister Lara's death, and said they wanted justice. I believe you have the emotion and the tremendous effect that will come from families demonstrating to you, that "this is enough, we have had enough, we want to control this," and we certainly do thank you greatly for serving.

Mr. LAWN. If I could mention, Madam Chairman, at a prior subcommittee hearing, a subcommittee which you chair, we had discussed our education program involving the high school coaches.

So effective has this program been, that six foreign countries have asked us for that background material, so that they can initiate such a program.

Senator HAWKINS. That really is rewarding to hear that. I have been to all the drug-producing countries, and the second thing they ask for, after your cooperation and the State Department's cooperation, is a copy of our education materials, which we have submitted to all countries in their language.

If it works here, with comic books, et cetera, and works with sports, we felt it would work with soccer, or whatever the sport is in their country.

I commend your department for having such good materials. It is really refreshing to be able to help in education, which is part of this committee's responsibility, the full committee, as well as enforcement and eradication. Thank you so much.

Senator METZENBAUM. Madam Chairman, it is my understanding that Senator Dodd will have some written questions for Mr. Lawn.

Senator HAWKINS. That is fine. Several Senators do and they may submit them within the next 24 hours, Senator.

Thank you. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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